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LIMITING THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT TO 
EXCLUDE 
Andrea J. Boyack* 
ABSTRACT 
For decades, society’s disparate interests and priorities have stymied 
attempts to resolve issues of housing affordability and equity.  Zoning law 
and servitude law, both of which have been robustly empowered by 
decades of jurisprudence, effectively grant communities the legal right and 
ability to exclude various sorts of residences from their wealthiest 
neighborhoods.  Exclusion by housing type results in exclusion of 
categories of people, namely, renters, the relatively poor, and racial 
minorities.  Although our society’s housing woes may indeed be intractable 
if we continue to treat a group’s right to exclude with the level of deference 
that such exclusionary efforts currently enjoy, this treatment is 
unjustifiable.  Courts should acknowledge and consider the broad public 
and private costs that are created by a group’s unfettered right to exclude.  
A more balanced approach would weigh individual autonomy to control 
property and various public harms resulting from community exclusions 
against legitimate community needs to exclude certain residents and uses.  
Judicial limits of the collective right to exclude may enable real progress 
toward fair and affordable housing to be achieved at last. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, there is nothing remarkable about judicial enforcement of 
local use-based zoning restrictions or private community regulations 
prohibiting rental housing in a given community.  Most courts agree that 
public and private community interests in maximizing property values and 
development harmony amply justify far-reaching zoning and servitude 
limitations on an individual owner’s control of her property.  In some 
cases, the public good might actually warrant such limitations on individual 
property rights, but perhaps not in cases where asserted public benefits are 
outweighed by actual public harms.  The question of whether a community 
can exclude certain uses and residents from its midst should be determined 
by balancing not only purported community benefits against the autonomy 
impact of limitations on a particular owner’s right to use, but should also 
weigh the broader societal harms caused by a collective right to exclude, 
including ill-effects on non-owners, including would-be residents, and on 
the housing market as a whole.  Such broader effects could in many cases 
justify limitations on a group’s right to exclude.  By limiting a 
community’s ability to exclude, courts may be able to break through the 
land-use stalemate that currently renders America’s housing system 
unsustainable and unfair and may allow market forces and individual 
owner self-interest to increase housing supply, affordability, and equity. 
In his thought-provoking article, “Affordable Housing” As Metaphor,1  
Professor Steven J. Eagle articulates and addresses the systemic challenges 
that plague efforts to achieve three affordable housing goals:  (1) 
developing an ample supply of a range of housing that maximizes 
economic productivity, (2) preserving neighborhood accessibility and value 
for existing residents, and (3) improving housing affordability and equity.2  
                                                                                                                             
 1. Steven J. Eagle, “Affordable Housing” As Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301 
(2017).  Professor Eagle frames “affordable housing” as a metaphor for disparate societal 
agendas.  Here, I conceive of the issue of affordable housing in a more economic sense, 
focusing on localized supply constraints (in terms of housing type and location) and the 
resulting inflated price of housing, and comparing broad societal costs of community 
limitations on local housing supply to its asserted benefits. 
 2. Id. at 304-05.  Professor Eagle points out that housing affordability concerns 
typically focus on housing needs of low- and extremely low-income households, but that 
optimal prosperity in a city requires housing affordable for a range of incomes.  
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Although noting that scholars and government agencies have broadly 
asserted the need for society to achieve all three of these housing goals, 
Eagle points out that numerous social and economic forces prevent each of 
these important objectives from being achieved.3  Affordable/fair housing 
problems are indeed multifaceted and tangled, and we lack an adequate 
weapon to cleanly and quickly slice through them á la Gordian Knot.  
Acknowledging that there can be no quick and easy solution without the 
unlikely “broad change in political will leading to a consensus on goals and 
priorities,”4 Eagle suggests that we settle for a series of Burkean 
incremental changes that may eventually work marginal improvements in 
housing supply, neighborhood quality, and integration.5  Eagle is correct 
that housing problems will not self-resolve,6 but a bold new approach to a 
group right to exclude could possibly give housing a needed push. 
In many cases, upholding a community’s right to exclude reflects the 
long-held governmental polity preference for homeownership over rental 
residency.7  Federal legislatures and courts have consistently upheld the 
                                                                                                                             
Neighborhood preservation concerns exist for both distressed urban cores that are 
vulnerable to gentrification and—at the opposite end of the income scale—for wealthier 
suburban neighborhoods resisting densification and housing development, including 
location of affordable rental housing in such neighborhoods.  Eagle explains that “affordable 
housing” conflates multiple concerns impacting equitable and financial needs for adequate 
shelter, quality neighborhoods, and residential integration. See also Tim Iglesias, 
Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s Contributions to Both Affordable Housing and 
Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585, 585 (2015) (exploring how changes in 
zoning law can address both financial and equitable housing mandates); J. Peter Byrne & 
Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy:  The Matrix 
Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 527, 528 (2007) (discussing the complex and 
comprehensive objectives that housing policy attempts to address).  Housing “equity” 
concerns not only affordability but also neighborhood desegregation and fair access to 
housing for all individuals, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, disability, or family status, 
inter alia. 
 3. Eagle, supra note 1, at 305 (decrying the “lack of a societal consensus” that “tends 
to perpetuate the status quo,” and pointing out the conflicting, opaque, inefficient, corrupt, 
and abusive practices that have marked local government actions with respect to housing). 
 4. Id. at 307.  Eagle explains that forceful constituent preferences pressure 
governments to carry out homeowners’ collective desire for neighborhood exclusivity. Id. at 
316-18. 
 5. Id. at 307 (referencing EDMOND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN 
FRANCE (1791)) (suggesting that “modest efforts, building upon a Burkean notion of 
incremental change, might be more prudent and ultimately desirable”). 
 6. Id.  The contradictory objectives of various interested groups are apparent in “the 
promulgation of ordinances and regulations demanding either densification or large-lot 
zoning, lawsuits objecting to development approvals based on often-ostensible 
environmental concerns, and judicial challenges to community growth that disparately affect 
legally protected groups, without regard to intent.” Id. at 308. 
 7. See Andrea J. Boyack, Equitable Housing (Almost) Half a Nation of Renters, 64 
BUFF. L. REV. 109, 125-130 (2017) [hereinafter Nation of Renters]; see also KENNETH T. 
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:  THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190-94 
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right of local governments to use zoning laws to exclude rental populations 
and rental uses from a community,8 even in cases where owner-occupant 
segregation has disparately impacted populations protected under the Fair 
Housing Act.9  Very few states have pushed back against local self-
determination when it comes to neighborhood content.10  Homeowners who 
vote (“homevoters”) have captured local governments to some extent, and 
this has inspired some scholars and legislators to advocate for more federal 
                                                                                                                             
(1985) (exploring the government’s complicity in and the social costs of the phenomenon of 
suburbanization); DONALD A. KRUECKEBERG, THE GRAPES OF RENT:  A HISTORY OF RENTING 
IN A COUNTRY OF OWNERS 9-10 (1999) (explaining the “ideology of property” and how 
federal preferences for homeownership reflects this); William Apgar, Rethinking Rental 
Housing:  Expanding the Ability of Rental Housing to Serve as a Pathway to Economic and 
Social Opportunity 4-5 (JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., HARV. UNIV., Working Paper No. 
W04-11, 2004) (criticizing the government’s subsidization of homeownership and 
cataloguing the harms mis-incentives to purchase real property have created).  The federal 
government’s long history of favoritism to owners as opposed to renters has undercut efforts 
to improve fair and affordable housing for all. Nation of Renters, supra. See also John J. 
Infranca, Housing Resource Bundles:  Distributive Justice and Federal Low-Income 
Housing Policy, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1071, 1137 (2015) (advocating for equality and 
utilization of the “bundle of resources approach” to achieve this end); Myron Orfield, Racial 
Integration and Community Revitalization:  Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1753 (2005) (explaining “the deep 
legal and philosophical contradiction in the United States between civil rights guarantees—
particularly the duty to affirmatively further fair housing—and state and federal low-income 
housing policy” and arguing that fair housing duty should take priority before other policy 
considerations). 
 8. Municipalities have broad discretion to exclude based on zoning laws.  In some 
cases, municipalities have even been able to legally exclude non-homeowners from 
communities, claiming that renters needed to be stopped from spreading like a virus in their 
community. See Dean v. City of Winona, 843 N.W.2d 249, 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), cert 
granted (No. A13-1028) (Minn. May 20, 2014), vacated as moot 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 
2015).  Homeowners’ associations and other common interest communities have even more 
judicial leeway to exclude non-owners and other populations and property uses from their 
midst. See Andrea J. Boyack, American Dream in Flux:  The Endangered Right to Lease A 
Home, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 203, 230-31 (2014) [hereinafter American Dream in 
Flux]. 
 9. See, e.g., Pres. at Forrest Crossing Townhome Ass’n v. DeVaughn, 2013 WL 
396000, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2013). But see, e.g., Bailey v. Stonecrest Condo. 
Ass’n. Inc., 696 S.E.2d 462, 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Villas W. II of Willowridge v. 
McGlothin, 841 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), vacated as moot 885 N.E.2d 1274 
(Ind. 2008), rev’d, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1284 (Ind. 2008). 
 10. The most notable example of state push-back against local exclusionary policies is 
the New Jersey Supreme Court holding that localities had the obligation to provide fair and 
affordable housing in their jurisdictions in the series of Mount Laurel decisions. Hills Dev. 
Co. v. Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 632 (N.J. 1986); S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of 
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount 
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel Cases]. See also Eagle, supra 
note 1, at 336-37 (discussing the Mount Laurel doctrine as well as inclusionary zoning 
efforts in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, affordable housing allocations in 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, and the complex and “not totally useless” provisions in 
California law). 
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oversight with respect to local land use decisions and their effect.11  The 
federal government may be unable to engineer a top-down solution, 
however, because Congress also remains beholden to public opinion, and 
public opinion can be illogical, and fickle.12 
Even if competing constituent objectives inhibit a comprehensive 
political solution to the decades-old affordable housing crisis, the legal 
system can still take steps to disengage housing issues from the tug-of-war 
of opposing interest groups.  Instead of merely waiting for a political 
consensus to develop, courts should de-politicize the issue of affordable 
                                                                                                                             
 11. See, e.g., OFF. OF U.S. SEN. MARIA CANTWELL, ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & HOMELESSNESS:  THE HOUSING TAX CREDIT 4-7 (2016); HOUSING 
DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT, THE WHITE HOUSE (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/white
house.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DWP-
3HWV]; A Responsible Market for Rental Housing Finance:  Envisioning the Future of the 
U.S. Secondary Market for Multifamily Residential Rental Mortgages, CTR. FOR AMERICAN 
PROGRESS (2010); Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal Housing 
Administration in the New Millennium, 11 J. HOUS. RES. 357, 357 (2000); Nation of Renters, 
supra note 7.  Even Eagle admits that “it is likely that the federal judicial and executive 
branches will become more immersed in local housing decisions,” although he believes that 
such a role is an awkward one for the federal government. Eagle, supra note 1, at 306. 
 12. Professor Eagle highlights the political barriers to achieving a sustainable legislative 
approach to the various challenges termed “affordable housing.” Eagle, supra note 1, at 344-
46.  Eagle also aptly notes that “[m]uch will depend on whether President Trump and his 
administration would be desirous of pursuing those goals,” namely, HUD’s renewed 
commitment to the goal of affirmatively furthering Fair Housing. Id. at 351.  Prior to being 
appointed the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Ben Carson, publicly decried 
the “socialist [sic] experiment” of affirmative governmental efforts to further Fair Housing. 
Ben S. Carson, Experimenting With Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2015), 
http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-try-to-
accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/G9GY-CP4B].  Although Trump initially indicated that he 
would support revitalizing inner cities, later proposals to cut HUD’s funding by more that 
six billion reinforces the current lack of political will to tackle affordable housing at the 
federal level. See Jose A. DelReal, Trump Budget Asks for $6 Billion in HUD Cuts, Drops 
Development Grants, WASH. POST. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/trump-budget-asks-for-6-billion-in-hud-cuts-drops-development-grants/2017/03/15/
1b157338-09a0-11e7-b77c-0047d15a24e0_story.html [https://perma.cc/EG34-B5P6]; Jose 
A. DelReal, Fair Housing Advocates Call Potential HUD Cuts “Devastating,” WASH. POST. 
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fair-housing-advocates-call-
potential-hud-cuts-devastating/2017/03/09/b8dcbf88-0511-11e7-b1e9-
a05d3c21f7cf_story.html [https://perma.cc/9WVV-5G63].  Carson’s recently expressed 
opinions regarding affordable housing and predictions that the Trump administration will 
pull back on HUD’s nascent push to affirmatively further fair housing under the 2015 AFFH 
Rule make it increasingly unlikely that there will be a top-down federal solution to the three 
housing problems Eagle discusses during the Trump Administration.  Megan R. Wilson, 
Carson Likely to Roll Back Housing Equity Rule, HILL (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/313970-carson-likely-to-roll-back-housing-
equality-rule [https://perma.cc/U9TL-Q2L9]; Yamichi Alcindor, Don’t Make Housing for 
the Poor Too Cozy, Carson Warns, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/us/politics/ben-carson-hud-poverty-plans.html 
[https://perma.cc/25MQ-KURC]. 
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housing so that market forces could naturally work to increase housing 
supply, affordability, and equity.  This can be done by reining in the 
property right of a community to exclude certain uses and populations from 
its boundaries.13  By adopting a more skeptical view of a group’s asserted 
exclusionary justifications, and by promoting individuals’ rights to control 
the possession and use of their private property, courts might counteract 
one of the principal causes of housing unaffordability and unfairness:  the 
broadly supported right of communities to exclude.  If housing production 
and location can be somewhat freed from community zoning and servitude 
control, economic motivators may provide leverage to break through our 
current political stalemate and, ultimately, create more efficient and fair 
housing. 
Part I of this Article explains the various justifications that have been 
cited in upholding a group’s collective right to exclude and acknowledges 
that limiting a group’s right to exclude would reduce the community’s 
power of self-determination.  As articulated in Part II, however, limiting 
the collective right to exclude may in some cases be warranted based on the 
costs that certain group exclusions impose on individuals (owners and non-
owners) and on society as a whole.  Part III briefly considers how a group’s 
right to exclude might be constrained through a new judicial approach to 
zoning and servitude law, even in the absence of sufficient political will to 
enact federal or state regulations of local exclusionary powers.  This Article 
concludes that judicial limits on collective rights to exclude could remove 
market barriers to equitable and affordable housing. 
I.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
A. The Core Right in Property’s Proverbial Bundle of Sticks 
Every first-year law student learns that property is a collection, or 
“bundle,” of legal rights with respect to a given thing.  Like the empowered 
pigs in Orwell’s Animal Farm,14 however, some sticks in this proverbial 
                                                                                                                             
 13. See, e.g., Lutz v. New Albany City Plan. Comm’n, 101 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Ind. 1951); 
Sycamore Realty Co. v. People’s Counsel of Baltimore Cty., 684 A.2d 1331, 1337 (Md. 
1996); City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 39 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Neb. 1949); Roselle v. Mayor & 
Council of Borough of Moonachie, 139 A.2d 42, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958); 
Newport Assocs. v. Solow, 283 N.E.2d 600, 600 (N.Y. 1972); McElveen-Hunter v. 
Fountain Manor Ass’n, 386 S.E.2d 435, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d, 399 S.E.2d 112 
(1991). Courts almost always assert that common interest community restrictions trump 
individual rights to control their property because “each individual unit owner purchases his 
unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed.” See Hidden Harbour Estates, 
Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
 14. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 192 (1946). 
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bundle seem to have become “more equal than others.”15  Courts and 
scholars have christened the right to exclude the superlative right among all 
property rights.16  Recent property scholarship has shown a renewed 
theoretical interest in the core right to exclude, but its property law primacy 
is foundational.17  William Blackstone himself famously defined property 
in terms of the right to exclude, explaining that property is “that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.”18  Indeed, the essence of an owner’s specifically enforceable 
right to exclude at her whim is what distinguishes what Professors 
Calabresi and Melamed term a “property” sort of right from other sorts of 
                                                                                                                             
 15. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKING:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 63 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 730-31 (1998). 
 16. Merrill, supra note 15, at 730.  Professor Merrill calls the right to exclude the “sine 
qua non” of property, far “more than just ‘one of the most essential constituents’ of 
property,” citing to Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (in which the 
court held that “the right to exclude others” is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle 
of rights that are commonly characterized as property”).  As Merrill points out, the Supreme 
Court has quoted their characterization of the right to exclude in several other cases 
pertaining to alleged regulatory takings, including Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
384 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992); and Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).  In Loretto v. Teleprompter, Justice Scalia even 
held that a regulation permanently limiting an owner’s right to exclude something as 
physically insignificant as a television cable was a per se compensable taking. 458 U.S. 419, 
435 (1982) (calling the right to exclude, “one of the most treasured rights of property”). 
 17. The Supreme Court has long championed individual owners’ right to exclude.  For 
example, Justice Brandeis, in 1918, noted that “[a]n essential element of individual property 
is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.” Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 
248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  See also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (characterizing the right to 
exclude as “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest”).  Although scholars sometimes 
quibble with respect to whether the right to exclude is, as Professor Glazer put it, property’s 
“favorite child or only child,” scholars recognize that the right to exclude is at least a 
fundamental part of what makes property rights property rights. Elizabeth M. Glazer, Rule 
of (Out)law:  Property’s Contingent Right to Exclude, 156 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 331, 343 
(2008). See e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BATRON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW:  
OWNERSHIP, USE, AND CONSERVATION 53 (2006) (stating that “the cornerstone of private 
property is the right to exclude anyone and anything from your property that you don’t want 
on your property”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to 
Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2006) (calling the right to exclude “foremost 
among the property rights”).  Note that the primacy of the right to exclude is not universally 
acknowledged, and several prominent scholars have pointedly rejected the absoluteness of 
an owner’s exclusionary rights.  See, e.g., JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:  THE PARADOXES 
OF PROPERTY 95-139 (2000); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 746-48 (2009). 
 18. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1765-1769).  
Blackstone subsequently qualified this oft-quoted hyperbolic assertion. 
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rights.19  The right to exclude is part of what enables an owner’s property 
rights to protect her autonomy,20 liberty,21 privacy,22 and personhood.23  In 
American jurisprudence, an individual’s property right to exclude is, in a 
word, “sacred.”24 
B. Justifications for a Collective Right to Exclude 
The right to exclude may be a critical component of an individual’s 
property rights, but that does not render the right to exclude inviolable, 
particularly in the context of such a right exercised by a collective rather 
than an individual.  Neighborhoods, communities, and municipalities assert 
the right to exclude (and other property rights) through planning, zoning 
and restrictive covenants, and some courts and scholars conflate such 
asserted group rights (including the right to control communal property and 
to control property uses and inhabitants in a neighborhood), with individual 
property rights in order to evidence their legitimacy.25  In fact, however, the 
                                                                                                                             
 19. “An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who 
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary 
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller,” contrasted 
with the value-only protection that a “liability rule” provides. Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
 20. See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 406 (Foundation Press 2007); Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends:  The 
Publicness of Private Law Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1284-90 (2014); Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354-58 (1967); John 
Martinez, Bikinis and Efficient Trespass Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 290, 290 (2013). 
 21. See Norman Karlin, Back to the Future:  From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SW. U. L. 
REV. 627, 638 (1988) (“To the framers [of the Constitution], identifying property with 
freedom meant that if you could own property, you were free.”); see also David L. Callies & 
J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property:  A Fundamental 
Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39-40 (2000). 
 22. See Jace C. Gatewood, The Evolution of the Right to Exclude-More Than A Property 
Right, A Privacy Right, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 447, 448 (2014). 
 23. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN L. REV. 957, 957-58 
(1982). 
 24. In United States v. Jones, Justice Scalia opined that “our law holds the property of 
every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his 
leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his 
neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.” 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (citing Entick v. 
Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)). 
 25. For a discussion of a community’s right to exclude with respect to a common 
property, see Merrill, supra note 15, at 750-51.  For legal opinions equating community with 
individual property rights, see, e.g., Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Witrak, 
810 P.2d 27, 28 (Wash. App. 1991) (holding that the collective property interests of a 
community amply justified density restrictions, even when these restrictions were created in 
conjunction with unenforceable racial restrictions on occupancy).  Free speech concerns 
were balanced against the “property rights” of a group of owners (a community association) 
in Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 890 A.2d 947, 961 
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underlying justifications for protecting owners’ individual rights to exclude 
are quite distinct from the relevant concerns in the context of a group, and 
the impacts of individual exclusions are likewise dissimilar to the impacts 
of collective exclusions.26  Nevertheless, our culture, society, and laws 
generally do support the existence of a collective right to exclude, in part 
because the ability to exclude outsiders is seen as an essential part of 
establishing and preserving group identity.27  Conceptually, boundaries are 
necessary for defining an “us,” and in order for boundaries to have meaning 
they must be strong enough to exclude a “them.”28 
Based upon this asserted need to preserve a group’s identity, courts have 
recognized the existence of broad exclusionary powers in the realm of 
property law.  But justifications for an individual’s property right to 
exclude do not necessarily translate into justifications for group-based 
exclusions.29  In the context of housing, municipalities exercise their right 
to exclude through zoning authority that limits entry into a community 
                                                                                                                             
(N.J. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 929 A.2d 1060 (2007).  The collective right of a community to 
exclude residents is related to an organization’s right to exclude from its membership (right 
of association), a concept most infamously explored during the past two decades with 
respect to the Boy Scouts of America. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003); see also John D. Inazu, 
The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 
(2010).  In the context of a neighborhood, however, the impacts of exclusion on would-be 
residents affects access to physical space, not just access to association membership.  
 26. For example, a few courts have held that individual rights to transfer property should 
be protected against zoning provisions attempting to exclude renters from neighborhoods. 
Gangemi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Fairfield, 763 A.2d 1011, 1018 (Conn. 
2001).  For more on the particular costs that arise in the context of group exclusions, see 
infra Part II. 
 27. Professor Stahl explained that “the very notion of community, however broadly 
conceived, is dependent on exclusion.” Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 
TEMP. L. REV. 487, 492 (2017). See also Georgette Chapman Phillips, Boundaries of 
Exclusion, 72 MO. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2007) (explaining the “we feeling” as a desire to 
belong, which is connected with exclusion of those who do not belong). 
 28. RICHARD SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER:  PERSONAL IDENTITY & CITY LIFE 36-40 
(1970). See also Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:  Residential 
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989) (explaining that a boundary’s 
instrumental function is maintaining a group’s separate identity); Robert C. Ellickson, The 
False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983 (2010); Stahl, 
supra note 27; Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries, supra note 17. 
 29. Phillips, supra note 27, at 1288 (asking “if a citizen can defend and exclude based 
on individual property rights, can a community that is composed of citizens likewise defend 
and exclude non-community members from community property?”).  Economist Robert 
Nelson would answer this question in the affirmative and claim that zoning is essentially a 
transfer of the private property right to exclude from the individual to the community, as a 
collective property right. ROBERT NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 146-47 (2005). 
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(often through segregation of uses).30  Euclidean, use-based zoning is 
founded on the notion that optimal land use requires the exclusion of 
certain uses in order to protect other uses.31  In the Euclid case itself, the 
Supreme Court upheld local land-use regulations that precluded 
commercial and non-owner-occupancy residential use from being located 
in a single-family, owner-occupied residential neighborhood.32  The growth 
of common interest communities has empowered smaller subsets of society 
to self-identify and self-govern in an exclusionary way using servitude 
law.33  Gated and planned communities governed by homeowners’ 
                                                                                                                             
 30. Although municipal boundaries are indeed “porous,” in that there is little that a local 
government can do to legally block someone from moving into a particular jurisdiction, 
zoning restrictions on certain uses and types of property can effectively do just that. Phillips, 
supra note 27, at 1288 (“Municipal boundaries, although superficially quite porous, reify 
when utilized to differentiate residents from non-residents.”).  For example, limitations on 
rental-occupancy, multi-family housing, or affordable housing units can be effective ways to 
keep poorer inhabitants out of a given community.  It was this very exclusionary effect that 
inspired the New Jersey Supreme Court to strike down the zoning laws at issue in the Mount 
Laurel cases. See Mount Laurel Cases, supra note 10. 
 31. The Supreme Court first upheld a city’s exclusionary zoning laws as a valid exercise 
of police power in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 32. In Euclid, the land use that was alleged to endanger residential neighborhoods was 
the construction of multifamily rental housing. Id.  Although not articulated as such, clear 
undertones of racial discrimination are apparent in the imagery of the Euclid opinion. 
Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2001).  
Justice Southerland states in his opinion that apartment houses “come very close to being 
nuisances,” and calls multifamily rental housing “a mere parasite.” Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-
95.  See also Eagle, supra note 1, at 320 (discussing Euclid).  Since the Euclid decision, use-
based zoning has become a widespread norm across most of America.  “Operating from the 
premise that everything has its place, [Euclidean] zoning is the comprehensive division of a 
city into different use zones.” JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, 
LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.2, 70 (1998).  For more on 
the pros and cons of Euclidean zoning, see generally Eliza Hall, Divide and Sprawl, Decline 
and Fall:  A Comparative Critique of Euclidean Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 915 (2007). 
 33. A “common interest community” is defined by the Restatement (Third) of Property 
to be a “development or neighborhood in which individually owned lots or units are 
burdened by a servitude” that cannot be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.:  SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000).  Common interest communities (“CICs”) 
include condominiums, cooperatives, and neighborhoods governed by homeowner 
associations (also known as planned unit developments or “PUDs”).  Data regarding the 
number of CICs and their residents is tracked by the Community Association Institute 
(“CAI”), and based on CAI data, there were more than sixty-five million residents of CICs 
as of 2016, representing 20.1% of the U.S. population at the time (323 million in 2016), as 
estimated by the U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. CMT. ASS’NS INST., https://www.caionline.org/About
CommunityAssociations/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/AH9A-VPTS]; Population 
Finder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_
facts.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/2ZJC-L4BU].  The initial popularity of community 
restrictive covenants likely reflects the desire of multiple societal segments (governments, 
banks, as well as white communities) to exclude non-white residents from higher 
opportunity, suburban neighborhoods.  Indeed, the use of race-based occupancy restrictions 
was widespread until the middle of the twentieth century and were explicitly encouraged by 
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associations can use covenants and community rulemaking to exclude 
certain types of uses as well as certain types of people.34  Although the 
legal ability of both zoning and servitude law to exclude based on 
enumerated, protected grounds is somewhat constrained by constitutional 
provisions and the Fair Housing Act,35 ample leeway still exists for 
communities to engage in less protected (or less direct) forms of 
discrimination and to erect various types of legal barriers to entry into a 
community.36 
                                                                                                                             
the Federal Housing Administration and the National Association of Realtors and (until the 
seminal Shelley v. Kraemer decision of 1948) upheld and enforced by the Supreme Court. 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1924). 
 34. Reciprocal restrictive covenants can create private restrictions on land use that 
function like a sort of private zoning law.  These covenants are enforceable based on the 
principles of servitude law as perpetual limitations on the land.  Such servitude-based 
restrictions often limit land use in much more extensive ways than even local zoning laws. 
Andrea J. Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints and the Hazard of 
Unbounded Servitudes, 42 REAL EST. L.J. 450, 454-57 (2014) [hereinafter Unbounded 
Servitudes]; American Dream in Flux, supra note 8, at 220-21. See also Paula A. Franzese, 
Privatization and its Discontents:  Common Interest Communities and the Rise of 
Government for “the Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 335, 336-37 (2005) (“Covenants have been 
devised to regulate everything from whether pets are permitted, what the maximum weight 
of an allowed pet must be, the permissibility and, if permitted, the design of one’s doghouse 
and birdhouse, the precise contours of landscaping content and style, the architectural style 
of one’s home, the color of one’s home, the color of one’s shutters, the color of one’s 
interior drapes, the permissibility of screen doors, the posting of signs, and even the 
propriety of wok-cooking.”). 
 35. The Supreme Court invalidated race-based zoning in the early twentieth century. 
Buchanan v. Wharley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting 
“colored” people from occupying certain houses was unconstitutional).  The Fair Housing 
Act prohibits the denial of housing based on race, religion, national origin, family status, or 
disability. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).  The Act, as 
amended, prohibits discrimination in sale, rental, and financing of dwellings and in other 
housing-related transactions, based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial 
status (including children under the age of eighteen living with parents or legal custodians, 
pregnant women, and people securing custody of children under the age of eighteen), and 
disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).  Under the Act, it is illegal to lie about housing 
availability, advertise discriminatorily, steer buyers to or from housing based on a suspect 
criteria, or choose not to rent or sell property based on such a criteria. See id.  Housing 
segregation was identified as one of the greatest threats facing American Society when the 
Fair Housing Act was passed in 1968. REP. OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. 
DISORDERS 115-20, 263 (March 1, 1968) [hereinafter the Kerner Commission Report].  The 
Fair Housing Act was passed in the wake of violent urban riots and the assassination of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. See id. at 259; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 26-50 (1993).  
States have also passed fair housing legislation, in many cases expressly invalidating race-
based occupancy restrictive covenants. See American Dream in Flux, supra note 8, at 224 
n.129. 
 36. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the “Secession of the 
Successful”:  Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675, 
1689-91 (2001) (calling the “practice of exclusion” the “familiar, unfortunate way of the 
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In upholding a group’s right to exclude by using zoning or private land 
restrictions, courts and legislatures reference any of three basic 
justifications:  (i) the need to avoid property law’s incompatible use 
problem, (ii) the need to address the tragedy of the commons in the context 
of publicly used amenities, and (iii) the desire of a community to create an 
identity and preserve its property values.  The first two justifications are 
fairly legitimate; but the last may be less justifiable, particularly if the 
asserted benefits of the community’s exclusion are balanced against the 
exclusion’s true costs. 
The possibility of spillover harms from particular land uses justifies 
some measure of use exclusion by a group.  After all, a factory or a cattle 
feedlot will almost certainly create negative externalities that impose costs 
on surrounding homeowners.37  Some uses simply should not be 
proximately located to one another, as Ronald Coase famously explained in 
his hypothetical regarding a confectioner situated next to a physician.38  
The tort of nuisance theoretically provides a common law limit on 
improper (or improperly located) land uses, but nuisance law is of limited 
utility because it is notoriously difficult to predict and apply.39  Nuisance 
law’s deficiencies adequately justify the development of both zoning- and 
servitude-based limits on uses of land to the extent that such limitations are 
employed to avoid incompatible uses.  The problem is, of course, that some 
so-called limitations on purported “uses” of land are, in reality, barriers to 
entry for particular users.40  
                                                                                                                             
American suburb”); Chused, supra note 32; Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996); American Dream in Flux supra note 8. 
 37. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); Spur Indus., Inc. 
v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). 
 38. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8-9 (1960) 
(discussing Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)). See also id. at 26, 105-06, 112 
(explaining that negative externalities from land uses could be conceptualized as a 
reciprocal problem caused by the proximate location of incompatible uses). 
 39. Prosser famously called the common law of nuisance the most “impenetrable 
jungle” of the entire law, remarking that nuisance “has meant all things to all people, and 
has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a 
cockroach baked in a pie.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 616 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). See also Victor E. Schwartz & Phil 
Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:  Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational 
Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006) (explaining the amorphous nature of nuisance law and 
articulating a potential outer boundary for the principle). 
 40. Unbounded Servitudes, supra note 34, at 477 (explaining that leasing a home is 
actually the same use of the property as is residential use by an owner-occupant, since the 
use of a given parcel of real estate “turns on how it is enjoyed and employed by the party in 
possession”). 
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In the context of shared amenities or commonly held property, land use 
governance through zoning or servitude law is usually appropriate.41  
Public ownership of a resource can lead to collective action and free-rider 
problems.42  Public governance or private common interest community 
control address inefficiencies caused by this “tragedy of the commons.”43  
In the context of a municipality, the tragedy of the commons is solved 
through a combination of zoning, rules governing use of public property, 
and taxation power.44  In common interest communities, association 
assessment power together with covenant restrictions and Board of 
Directors’ governing powers similarly address freeriding and collective 
action problems.45  The need for governance and contribution in the context 
of commonly held property, however, does not necessarily sanitize all 
exclusionary powers of public or private governments.  For example, 
although mandatory golf club membership in upscale planned “golf course 
communities” is arguably responsive to the tragedy of the commons, the 
very design and creation of a golf course community might in itself 
indicate a troubling collective desire to exclude non-white residents from 
the neighborhood.46 
Land use regulation to combat negative externalities or to address the 
tragedy of the commons may be defensible on economic grounds, but it is 
harder to find a legitimate justification for a community’s desire to exclude 
simply in order to become and remain exclusive.  Nevertheless, courts have 
                                                                                                                             
 41. See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1375 (1994). 
 42. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI., NEW SERIES 1243, 1244-45 
(1968); Thrainn Eggertsson, Open Access versus Common Property, in TERRY L. ANDERSON 
& FRED S. MCCHESNEY, PROPERTY RIGHTS:  COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND LAW, 74-82, 84-
85 (2003); James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part II, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 325, 345, nn.50 (1992). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
 43. Andrea J. Boyack, Community Collateral Damage:  A Question of Priorities, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 53, 72-75 (2011) [hereinafter Community Collateral Damage]; MERRILL & 
SMITH, supra note 20, at 500-01. See also Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 891 (2004) (explaining that there are obvious tragedy of the 
commons problems in neighborhoods, but pointing out that there are “tragedy of the anti-
commons” problems as well). 
 44. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning:  A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 45 (1994); Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 281 (2016). 
 45. Community Collateral Damage, supra note 43, at 72; WAYNE S. HYATT, 
CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE:  COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 
29-32 (3d ed. 2000). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 907 (2004) (discussing ways that common interest communities use exclusionary 
rights to address the tragedy of the commons). 
 46. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 
VA. L. REV. 437 (2006). 
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upheld a collective’s right to exclude based on the community’s asserted 
need to create and maintain a distinctive identity,47 its asserted desire to 
preserve community culture,48 the hope for increased neighborhood 
harmony,49 and—most commonly—the purportedly legitimate objective of 
promoting local property values.50  Courts routinely cite to these public 
values when they uphold a community’s right to exclude.51 
It is relatively easy to characterize as improper efforts of white, upper-
class neighborhoods to exclude low-income housing assistance recipients.  
Such exclusions seem motivated by discrimination and elitism.  But similar 
goals to preserve a neighborhood’s character also motivate community 
efforts to exclude in a very different context:  resistance of development by 
poorer, ethnic enclaves.52  Numerous scholars have advocated that 
affordable housing be affirmatively included in low-poverty 
neighborhoods.53  It is less common for scholars to advocate inclusion of 
                                                                                                                             
 47. The right of a group of owners to, by majority-rule, pass exclusionary rules in order 
to protect the group’s identity is particularly robust in the context of housing cooperatives. 
See Harvey S. Epstein, Weisner Revisited:  A Re-Appraisal of a Co-Op’s Power to 
Arbitrarily Prohibit the Transfer of its Shares, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 477, 483-502 (1986).  
See also, e.g., Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 104 A.D.2d 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984); Goldstone v. Constable, 84 A.D.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Gorman v. 
Presidential Towers Residence, Inc., N.Y.L.J. 6 (Oct. 4, 1976) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (discussed in 
Epstein, supra).  Cooperatives have been specifically empowered to exclude on the basis of 
occupation (particularly for being a lawyer), family background (being from “new money”), 
and being “too public a figure.”  The idea that geographically defined neighborhoods (or 
people living in the same large multifamily building) have an inherent (or necessary) group 
identity, however, has been criticized as naïve.  Professor Frug explains that a suburban 
community is unlike “a voluntary association, such as a political organization, church, or 
country club,” because “[p]eople join voluntary associations to be with people like 
themselves or to pursue a common interest,” and suburban communities are, essentially, 
groupings of “strangers.” Frug, supra note 36, at 1050.  “Residents of America’s central 
cities lack this sense of a common identity.” Id.  
 48. See, e.g., Pres. at Forrest Crossing Townhome Ass’n, Inc. v. DeVaughn, 2013 WL 
396000 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2013).  Preservation of neighborhood culture is often the 
justification advanced for community efforts to exclude gentrification. See RUTH GLASS, 
ASPECTS OF CHANGE xvii (1964) (decrying the “invasion” of wealthier residents “into 
traditionally working class neighborhoods,” and explaining that gentrification harms the 
community by changing “the social character of the neighborhood”). 
 49. The court in a widely cited Florida case held that group exclusionary restrictions are 
reasonable and valid if they purport to support “the health, happiness and peace of mind of 
the unit owners.”  Hidden Harbour Est., Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. 1975). 
 50. See infra Section I.C.; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Tight Little Islands:  
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). 
 51. See American Dream in Flux, supra note 8, at 292-93; Unbounded Servitudes, supra 
note 34, at 467.  
 52. Eagle, supra note 1, 304-05. 
 53. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 2; Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory Inclusionary 
Zoning – The Answer to the Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 
(2006); Jania S. Nelson, Residential Zoning Regulations and the Perpetuation of Apartheid, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1704 (1996); Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial 
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gentrification in more impoverished, ethnic enclaves, and exclusion of 
“outsiders” is usually characterized as justified in that context.54  For 
example, efforts of the Orthodox Jewish community in New York City’s 
Lower East Side to exclude outsiders in order to “keep their community 
intact” are perceived as more legitimate than rich neighborhood efforts to 
exclude recipients of housing assistance.55 
Professor Ellickson has theorized that the value of group homogeneity 
and cohesiveness justifies a collective, community right to exclude.56  
Ellickson refers to a study by Robert Putnam regarding social capital in the 
context of diverse and homogeneous communities and notes that “residents 
of diverse neighborhoods have less social capital than do residents of more 
homogeneous neighborhoods,” explaining that diversity leads to “weaker 
ties to members of their own ethnic group” than those that exist in ethnic 
enclaves.57  Nevertheless, in the context of housing, a group’s right to 
exclude for exclusion’s sake is an exercise of privilege, whether the 
                                                                                                                             
Segregation in America:  Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and 
Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89 (1998); Lisa C. Young, Breaking 
the Color Line:  Zoning and Opportunity in America’s Metropolitan Areas, 8 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 667 (2005).  Some scholars, on the other hand, do criticize inclusionary 
efforts, even in the context of integrating poorer residents into better neighborhoods. See, 
e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1167 
(1981). 
 54. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City:  Class Transformation, 
Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 
(2008); Michael Barton, An Exploration of the Importance of the Strategy Used to Identify 
Gentrification, 53 URB. STUD. 92 (2016).  Jon Dubin, for example, advocated for “a right to 
protective zoning” to protect minority neighborhoods from the intrusion of “higher-quality 
residential” uses that would “create market pressures that effectively price out low-income 
residents through the process of gentrification.” Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to 
Gentrification:  Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of 
Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1993).  Cf. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for 
Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003) (pointing out the many economic benefits that inure 
to existing residents from gentrification in their neighborhoods).  To be fair, for many critics 
of gentrification, the source of harm comes not from community access, but rather from 
displacement of current residents. See, e.g., Hannah Weinstein, Fighting for a Place Called 
Home:  Litigation Strategies for Challenging Gentrification, 62 UCLA L. REV. 794 (2015) 
(stressing the displacement aspect of objectionable gentrification, and citing to ROLF 
GOETZE, UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE:  THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS IN URBAN 
REVITILIZATION (1979)). 
 55. Professor Eagle discusses the value of a community’s social capital in Eagle, supra 
note 1, at 316-17, and references efforts by the Orthodox Jewish community in New York 
City’s Lower East Side to exclude outsiders in order to “keep their community intact.” Id. at 
316. 
 56. Ellickson, False Promise, supra note 28. 
 57. Id. at 1014-15 (discussing Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum:  Diversity and 
Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007)). 
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privilege of high income elites or protected ethnic communities.58  The 
value preserved in upholding a community’s right to exclude is an aspect of 
“status property,” and protection of status typically benefits society’s 
“haves” at a cost to society’s “have nots.”59  As poignantly sung by Billie 
Holiday, “them that’s got shall get.  Them that’s not shall lose.”60 
A desire to promote high property values is perhaps the most ubiquitous 
justification given for a community’s right to exclude.61  This is 
unsurprising.  After all, the value of homes in a neighborhood reflects not 
only the quality of the physical structures in the neighborhood, but also 
popular perceptions regarding the quality of the people inhabiting those 
structures.62  This is why lenders, realtors, and even the federal government 
specifically encouraged communities to create restrictive covenants that 
would ensure that certain people (people of different races, religions, and 
ethnic backgrounds, as well as people with young children or disabilities), 
and these sorts of exclusions were rampant until they were prohibited by 
law.  The motive behind such collective exclusions was the shared desire of 
residents, mortgagees, and municipal taxing authorities to preserve 
neighborhood property values against declines that would occur by 
including these “undesirable” populations.63 
School segregation and quality also factor into a community’s right to 
exclude.  In the 1970s, the Supreme Court foreclosed the developing 
regulatory and judicial mandate to integrate schools using redistricting and 
busing, and in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court held that a region could divide 
                                                                                                                             
 58. “The maintenance of privilege necessitates the ability to exclude others from access.  
If all can freely obtain the advantages of the privileged group, the now unrestricted benefit 
correspondingly depreciates.” Bela August Walker, Privilege As Property, 42 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 47, at 55 (2013). 
 59. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013). See also 
Trina Jones, Occupying America:  Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the American Dream, and 
the Challenge of Socio-Economic Inequality, 57 VILL. L. REV. 339, 344 (2012). 
 60. Billie Holiday, God Bless the Child (Edward B. Marks Music Co., 1941). 
 61. See, e.g., Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass’n, v. Edna McGlothin, 
885 N.E.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Ind. 2008). 
 62. Professor Frug explains that for most cities and communities across the nation, 
“pursuit of prosperity has usually meant trying to attract the ‘better kind’ of commercial life 
and the ‘better kind’ of people while excluding the rest.” Frug, supra note 36, at 1048. 
 63. JESUS HERNANDEZ, The Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, THE 
RESIDUAL IMPACT OF HISTORY:  CONNECTING RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION, MORTGAGE 
REDLINING, AND THE HOUSING CRISIS (2009); Florence W. Roisman, The Lessons of 
American Apartheid:  The Necessity and Means of Promoting Residential Racial 
Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479, 489 (1995); Seitles, supra note 53, at 95.  The Federal 
Housing Administration expressly promoted racial restrictions in communities, tutored 
developers in the art of race-based restrictive covenants, and promulgated maps that 
designated certain neighborhoods undesirable based on the racial composition of their 
population. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 195; Andrea J. Boyack, A New American Dream for 
Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 573, 576-81 (2016) [hereinafter Detroit]. 
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into tiny self-governing school districts, and that each of these districts 
would have the right to exclude non-resident students.64  Once local school 
districts could exercise self-determination using their robust right to 
exclude, wealthier jurisdictions were able to effectively quarantine 
themselves from impoverished areas.65  Regional school system 
fractionalization separated poor (and often non-white) students and schools 
from their wealthy (and often white) counterparts.  School system 
exclusions not only effectively undermined the seminal holding of Brown 
v. Board of Education,66 but also allowed richer communities “to foster 
their own prosperity . . . at the expense of their neighbors.”67 
Doubtless, another motivation for creating exclusive communities has 
been fear of the “other.”68  Professor Cashin points out that gated 
communities’ appeal, and hence their value, very well may turn on 
perceptions of exclusivity and the ability to exclude, founded on a general 
sense that fairly homogeneous (typically majority white) neighborhoods are 
safer.69  Suburban neighborhoods’ raison d’être may very well be the 
desire to control the identity of one’s neighbors.  Community homogeneity 
                                                                                                                             
 64. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). See also Detroit, supra note 63, at 601-
04; Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041 (1984); Daniel Herz, You’ve Probably Never Heard of One of the 
Worst Supreme Court Decisions, WASH. POST (July 24, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/24/youve-probably-never-heard-of-one-of-the-worst-
supreme-court-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/K2SW-HZ7L]. 
 65. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999); Shane, 
supra note 64; Bradley W. Joondeph, A Second Redemption? Dismantling Desegregation:  
The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169 (1999).  
 66. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), rev’d in part sub nom., 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Ryan, supra note 65. 
 67. Frug, supra note 36, at 1048.  Political power, even in a democracy, does not in 
practice represent equality of opportunity.  As political scientist Harold Lasswell explains, 
elites have a substantial advantage when it comes to political influence and power. HAROLD 
D. LASSWELL, POLITICS:  WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936). 
 68. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 333-34 (1985). See also 
Seitles, supra note 53, at 90 (“The existence of isolated and racially segregated housing has 
preserved racial mistrust.”).  “See, you have to understand the fundamental feeling in 
suburbia is fear, let’s face it. The basic emotional feeling is fear.  Fear of blacks, fear of 
physical harm, fear of their kids being subjected to drugs, which are identified as a black 
problem, fear of all the urban ills.  They feel [that] by moving to the suburbs they’ve run 
away from it, in fact, they haven’t, in reality they haven’t, but in their own mind’s eye 
they’ve moved away from the problem.” EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, 
FORTRESS AMERICA:  GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 155-56 (1997).  Fear of 
others has even made it into law review articles as a legitimate basis to uphold a 
community’s right to exclude. See Laura T. Rahe, Note, The Right of Exclude:  Preserving 
the Autonomy of the Homeowners’ Association, 34 URB. LAW. 521, 521 (2002) (opining that 
“[i]f residents are to reap the benefits of membership, courts must uphold the associations’ 
right to exclude the general public from their property”). 
 69. Cashin, supra note 36, at 1682 (quoting from a marketing brochure for a gated 
community that strongly evokes community safety and exclusion of others). 
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in wealthier suburban communities has a perceived—and therefore 
actual—positive impact on property values.70  Community culture and 
property values are two oft-cited justifications for a group’s need to 
exclude the “other,” but perhaps the most emotionally charged asserted 
reason for a group’s right to exclude pertains to community safety.71  Data 
regarding crime and comparative sale prices of homes arguably lends 
exclusions motivated by safety concerns some legitimacy,72 in spite of a 
                                                                                                                             
 70. HADLEY ARKES, THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE CITY:  THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF URBAN 
POLITICS 324 (1981) (explaining that residents choose to live in a particular suburb 
particularly based on “a judgment about the kind of people one wished to live with, and the 
conditions under which one expected to live.”). 
 71. Blakely and Snyder note that a community’s preference for exclusion for 
exclusion’s sake appears to be more prevalent in areas with high immigrant populations. 
BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 68, at 1.  They note that “gated areas . . . represent[] a 
concrete metaphor for the closing of the gates against immigrants and minorities and the 
poverty, crime and social instabilities in society at large.” Id. at 152.  The surprising 
popularity of Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election similarly discloses a 
widespread fear of immigration and immigrants among suburban and rural white 
Americans. See, e.g., Mirren Gidda, How Donald Trump’s Nationalism Won Over White 
Americans, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-
nationalism-racism-make-america-great-again-521083 [https://perma.cc/SEZ4-U436]; Rich 
Morin, Behind Trump’s Win in Rural White America:  Women Joined Men in Backing Him, 
PEW RES. CTR (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/17/behind-
trumps-win-in-rural-white-america-women-joined-men-in-backing-him/ 
[https://perma.cc/J8VB-LXAS]; Toni Morrison, Making America White Again, NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/21/making-
america-white-again [https://perma.cc/7RZ6-3A2Y]; Derek Thompson, Donald Trump and 
the Twilight of White America, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/05/donald-trump-and-the-twilight-of-white-america/482655/ 
[https://perma.cc/JT27-RR66]. 
 72. See Judith R. Blau & Peter Michael Blau, The Cost of Inequality:  Metropolitan 
Structure and Violent Crime, 47 AM. SOC. REV. 114 (1982) (showing that economic 
inequality and not poverty or race is the dominant correlate with violent crime); Richard 
Block, Community, Environment, and Violent Crime, 3 CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1979) (showing a 
very strong correlation between violent crime and residential proximity between the poor 
and the middle class, even when controlling for other factors); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
& URB. DEV., IN THE CROSSFIRE:  THE IMPACT OF GUN VIOLENCE ON PUBLIC HOUSING 
COMMUNITIES, 14 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181158.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9V8Y-DXVF] (“There is a strong correlation between income and violent crime; thus the 
low-income population in public housing is especially vulnerable to gun violence.”); 
MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 18-19 (1976) (explaining the “inner 
city” concept that equated poorer, blacker neighborhoods with crime); Richard Thompson 
Ford, The Boundaries of Race:  Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1843 (1994).  It should not be ignored, however, that safety concerns have been widely 
invoked to justify discrimination based on race and national origin. See, e.g., Allison S. 
Hartry, Gendering Crimmigration:  The Intersection of Gender, Immigration, and the 
Criminal Justice System, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1 (2012) (discussing the 
“notorious example” of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods 
Act of 2010, known as S.B. 1070). 
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clear discriminatory effect.73  But community safety can be protected by 
less exclusionary means, and in many cases the need to exclude in order to 
protect is not necessarily based on any actual safety threat. 
There are some legitimate reasons for a community to exclude certain 
uses and users of a neighborhood.  Group exclusion is an important tool to 
resolve spillover effects and the problem of truly incompatible uses of 
proximate parcels.  Commonly used or held amenities in a neighborhood 
likely require some group exclusion in order to avoid freeriding and the 
overuse and under-maintenance of property.  A community’s desire to 
exclude in order to be perceived as exclusive, however, is somewhat more 
difficult to justify, even though such exclusion may to some extent promote 
community safety, character, and harmony.  Safety is important, but can be 
achieved in other ways.  The character of a homogenous neighborhood is 
not objectively preferable to that of a diverse one.  And short-term easy 
harmony achieved through enforced sameness while stoking fear of the 
“other” stymies society’s long-term ability to achieve social harmony that 
is genuine and enduring.  
C. Promoting Property Values by Limiting Housing Supply 
Limiting the development of additional housing in a particular 
community may also increase property values, based on basic economic 
theories of supply and demand.74  Excluding additional housing units or 
certain types of housing from a neighborhood limits the supply of housing, 
and caps on supply protect prices from the inevitable market-based 
decrease that would result from making more units available in a given 
location.75  Propping up housing prices by limiting the housing supply 
                                                                                                                             
 73. See generally Adam Gordon, Making Exclusionary Zoning Remedies Work:  How 
Courts Applying Title VII Standards to Fair Housing Cases Have Misunderstood the 
Housing Market, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 437 (2006); Margery Austin Turner & Stephen 
L. Ross, How Racial Discrimination Affects the Search for Housing, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
OPPORTUNITY:  RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 81, 86 (Xavier de 
Souza Briggs ed., 2005). 
 74. Elementary economic theory posits that increasing demand for a product relative to 
its supply will increase its price in the short term. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 199 (1890).  The law of supply and demand is fundamental economic theory 
and hypotheses that price will always move toward the point where quantities supplied and 
those demanded equalize.  In the realm of housing, studies have confirmed that economic 
theory holds true:  limited supply does increase the cost of housing. Michael Lewyn, Zoning 
and Land Use Planning, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 558, 558 (2016).  The economic impact of 
limitations on housing supply has been extensively documented by economists. See, e.g, Ed 
Glaeser & Joe Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, Zell/Lurie Working 
Paper #802 (Jan. 4, 2017), http://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/
03/802.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL6X-FAAD].  
 75. The law of supply and demand works in the inverse as well:  when supply increases 
relative to demand, price will decrease. MARSHALL, supra note 74, at 199. 
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benefits current homeowners who experience asset appreciation.  In 
addition, local governments, which raise revenue through property taxes, 
and developers, who profit from new home sales, benefit when 
comparative home values increase.76  Because courts presume that 
promoting a community’s property values is always a legitimate public 
concern, zoning and restrictive covenants that exclude additional housing 
units from being built in a community for this reason are usually upheld.77  
Artificially propping up property values by limiting housing supply, 
however, does in fact create significant adverse externalities on non-owners 
and the public in general.78 
As economic theory would have predicted, the recent dramatic upswing 
in demand for rental housing in the highest-growth areas of the country has 
led to an equally dramatic increase in rental rates.79  Economic theory 
would also anticipate that an increase in the demand for and price of a 
product would naturally cause supply of the product to eventually increase, 
and accordingly, one might expect huge increases in rental housing supply 
resulting from the recently dramatic uptick in rental housing price and 
                                                                                                                             
 76. See Community Collateral Damage, supra note 43. 
 77. See e.g., Quality Built Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Pinehurst, No. 1:06CV1028, 2008 WL 
3503149, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2008); Kasper v. Town of Brookhaven, 142 A.D.2d 
213, 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); G.M.P. Land Co. v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Hegins Twp., 601, 
457 A.2d 989, 995 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). Cf. Petition of Carpenter v. City of Petal, 699 
So. 2d 928, 934 (Miss. 1997). 
 78. Deficiency in supply of housing leads housing prices to increase, impacting 
affordability.  This imposes costs on lower-income households, who must spend a higher 
percentage of earnings on housing and therefore cannot afford to pay for necessary 
healthcare, education, and other expenses, let alone contribute disposable income to the 
economy in the form of discretionary consumption.  Higher home prices and increasing 
need for housing assistance drains the public fisc, imposing costs on all taxpayers.  The 
number of households requiring assistance increases as rental rates increase, and the amount 
needed to adequately supplement a renter’s ability to pay likewise grows with rising rental 
rates.  For further discussion of the costs of unaffordable housing, see Nation of Renters, 
supra note 7, and Andrea J. Boyack, Side by Side:  Revitalizing Urban Cores and Ensuring 
Residential Diversity, CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Side by Side].  
Furthermore, housing supply limitations has been shown to significantly constrain economic 
growth in a municipality. See Glaeser & Gyourko supra note 74, at 21-24. 
 79. The current state of housing market problems involving inadequate, expensive rental 
housing is discussed in the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University’s recent 
annual report.  JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., The State of the Nation’s 
Housing 2015 30-32 (2015) [hereinafter State of the Nation’s Housing 2015].  “Rental 
vacancies are reaching new lows, and rental rates are reaching new highs.” Nation of 
Renters, supra note 7, 109-10. See also Josh Miller, Eye on Housing:  Rental Vacancy Rate 
at 20 Year Low, EYE ON HOUS. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://eyeonhousing.org/2015/01/rental-
vacancy-rate-at-20-year-low [https://perma.cc/MUB4-K2BP]; Out of Reach 2015, NAT’L 
LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., at 4 (2015) http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2015_
FULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ9C-63J8] [hereinafter Out of Reach 2015]; Eagle, supra note 
1, at 335. 
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demand.80  But reality diverges from economic theory in that the supply of 
rental housing has been slow to respond to the increasing rental housing 
demand.81  There has been some, albeit inadequate, increase in the number 
of rental units in the housing market, but over the past several years, new 
housing units are clustered at the high-end of the market (luxury rentals).82  
Housing demand is constrained by income and cannot stretch to meet rising 
market rates.83  Thus, the supply of affordable housing remains well below, 
and has failed to keep pace with, burgeoning demand.84 
Why is affordable housing supply relatively unresponsive to increases in 
demand?  For one thing, local land-use systems (permitting, regulatory 
approvals, and the like) have significantly raised the cost of producing 
housing.85  Land-use compliance costs make it more difficult for 
                                                                                                                             
 80. “America’s population of renters is large and rapidly growing larger.” Nation of 
Renters, supra note 7, at 112.  “The median asking rate for rentals is now higher than ever 
before, having nearly doubled in the past two decades.” Id. at 117. See also ANTHONY 
DOWNS, GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING:  DO THEY CONFLICT? (2004).   
 81. “Supply inadequacies in rental housing across most income levels have exacerbated 
housing affordability problems.” Nation of Renters, supra note 7, at 117. See also Lewyn, 
supra note 74. See generally Eagle, supra note 1, at 335; Out of Reach 2015, supra note 79, 
at 5.  
 82. Nation of Renters, supra note 7, at 118, 124. See also Janet Viveiros et al., Paycheck 
to Paycheck:  A Snapshot of Housing Affordability for Millennial Workers, NAT’L HOUS. 
CONF. & CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, September 2015; Laura Kusisto, Rising Rents Squeeze 
Middle Class, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/middle-class-
families-feel-more-squeezed-by-rising-u-s-rents-1462738692 [https://perma.cc/WCF7-
E4V4]. 
 83. “An unprecedented 11 million renter households—more than one in four of all 
renters in the U.S.—spend more than half of their monthly income on rent.” THE CASE FOR 
EXPANDING THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT, AFFORD. HOUS. TAX CREDIT COAL, 
http://www.taxcreditcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Revised-Need-Docu
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9WZ-6BEU] [hereinafter EXPANDING LIHTC].  “Rapidly rising 
rents outpace wages, which have become fairly stagnant for most Americans.” Nation of 
Renters, supra note 7, at 118.  Rental rates have become “out of reach” for many workers, 
and “the number of renters spending more than they can afford on housing is unacceptably 
high and growing.” Housing America’s Future:  New Directions for National Policy, 
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 7-11 (Feb. 2013), http://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/default/files/BPC_Housing%20Report_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YY4-
TMRZ] [hereinafter Housing America’s Future].  Affordability affects home prices as well 
as rental rates in high-growth, intensively zoned cities. See Glaeser & Gyourko supra note 
74, at 10-17.  
 84. See State of the Nation’s Housing 2015, supra note 79, at 2, 3 fig. 3; OFF. OF POL’Y 
DEV. & RES., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., EVIDENCE MATTERS (Summer 2013); see 
also Nation of Renters, supra note 7, at 115-19 (explaining the various demographic and 
economic forces that have caused and will continue to cause the population of renters to 
grow). 
 85. James J. Hartnett, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and American 
Apartheid:  Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 
97 (1993) (concluding that “overregulation directly increases housing development costs 
both through lengthy and expensive approval processes and the imposition of high permit 
472 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
developers to produce a product that can be acquired in a market 
transaction, free from government subsidy.86  Gaps in affordability, after 
all, can result not only from inability of consumers to pay, but also from 
overly expensive real estate prices (land, regulatory approvals, plus 
production).87  The gap between the costs to create housing and what 
housing consumers can afford to pay (typically defined as 30% of gross 
income) is particularly true for housing with respect to households earning 
median and below-median incomes.88  Although federal, state, and local 
governments provide housing assistance to help fund this gap, there is 
insufficient funding to meet the need:  only one-fourth of households 
eligible for housing assistance actually receive it.89 
In addition to increasing costs of housing production, zoning barriers 
often preclude the location of affordable rental housing in the most 
desirable neighborhoods.90  Localities employ a wide variety of zoning 
tools to limit housing supply, including minimum lot sizes, setbacks, height 
restrictions, and other anti-density zoning requirements, as well as 
exclusion of multifamily housing from wealthier neighborhoods composed 
                                                                                                                             
fees—costs that are passed on to home buyers and renters.”).  See also Glaeser & Gyourko 
supra note 74, at 10-17 (measuring the impact of over-regulation of housing development 
by showing the extent to which housing prices exceed the “Minimum Profitable Production 
Cost” for housing). 
 86. Bernard K. Ham, Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segregation:  A Reconsideration 
of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 577, 587-88 (1997); Building 
Affordable Housing Communities using the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, AFFORD. 
RENTAL HOUS. A.C.T.I.O.N., Spring 2015, at 12-13, www.taxcreditcoalition.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/03/Housing-Credit-Ed-Deck-March-2015-ver-14-3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M2H9-Y9CN] [hereinafter Building Affordable Communities].  See also 
Apgar, supra note 7, at 7 (arguing that reducing the costs of zoning and regulatory approvals 
would positively impact housing affordability). 
 87. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on 
Housing Affordability, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 21 (2003). 
 88. Building Affordable Communities, supra note 86, at 6 (estimating that land 
development costs would have to be reduced by twenty-eight percent to make it profitable 
for the private sector to create affordable housing). 
 89. Housing America’s Future, supra note 83, at 10-11. See also Out of Reach 2015, 
supra note 79, at iii (noting that “only 25 percent of eligible households receive housing 
assistance”). 
 90. ADVISORY COMM’N ON REG. BARRIERS TO AFFORD. HOUS., Not In My Back Yard 1-1 
(1991); Kristine Nelson Fuge, Exclusionary Zoning:  Keeping People in Their Wrongful 
Places or a Valid Exercise of Local Control?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 148, 148 
(1996); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Saving Mount Laurel?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1615 
(2013); Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1 (2001). See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cnty., No. 06-CV-2860, 2012 WL 13777 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013).  Some of 
the locations with the most recent economic growth, such as San Francisco, also have the 
strictest exclusionary laws and covenants. Glaeser & Gyourko supra note 74, at 15-16 (“Our 
formula suggests that the land underlying this particular modest quality house cost about 
$490,000—roughly 10 times the amount presumed for MPPC calculations.”). 
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of single-family detached homes.91  Where public laws fail to impose such 
zoning limits, private servitude restrictions often perform the same 
function.92  Zoning and covenant restrictions on density and housing type 
adversely impact both affordability and availability of fair housing, and as 
long as group rights to exclude are upheld, such barriers to production will 
likely continue.93 
Homeowners are some of society’s most empowered interest holders, 
and they profit when local housing supply is limited; thus, homeowners are 
likely to put political pressure on municipalities and private governments to 
continue to erect roadblocks to housing production.94  This political 
pressure has been successful in achieving its aim.  Existing homeowners 
have benefitted from rising housing prices benefits, even as non-
homeowners in a community are simultaneously harmed.  Artificially 
limited supply and inflated housing costs in a community therefore 
operates as a wealth transfer from the least wealthy to the wealthiest 
segments of a community.95  The wealth transfer effect also exists across 
generations, with supply-constrained inflations of housing costs benefitting 
older people and correspondingly working economic harm on the younger 
                                                                                                                             
 91. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.13 (3d ed., 2016) (discussing minimum lot sizes 
and building setback lines); Richard Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I—The Structure of 
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1990) (discussing minimum lot sizes); 
Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71, 102 (1970) (discussing 
minimum lot sizes in Houston, a city purportedly without zoning); Side by Side, supra note 
78. See generally Lewyn supra, note 74; Michael Lewyn, The (Somewhat) False Hope of 
Comprehensive Planning, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 39 (2015); Hall, supra note 32; Michael 
Lewyn, You Can Have It All:  Less Sprawl and Property Rights Too, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1093 
(2007); Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl, Jewish Law, and Jewish Values, 13 SE. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 17-21 (2004).  For a look at anti-density zoning techniques employed in Canada, see 
Michael Lewyn, Sprawl in Canada and the United States, 44 URB. LAW. 85 (2012). 
 92. See generally, RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD:  RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).  
Courts are even less likely to invalidate community restrictive covenants that limit land use, 
both because, in theory, homeowners in a common interest community chose to be bound by 
these covenants and because such privately governed communities are not state actors 
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. See HYATT, supra, note 45, at 61-73; Fennell, 
Contracting Communities, supra note 43, at 857-60; Ryan McCarl, When Homeowners 
Associations Go Too Far:  Political Responses to Unpopular Rules in Common Interest 
Communities, 43 REAL EST. L.J. 453, 491-92 (2015). But see Andrea J. Boyack, Common 
Interest Community Covenants and the Freedom of Contract Myth, 22 J. L. & Pol’y 767 
(2014). 
 93. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 320; Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling 
Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 143-44 (2010). 
 94. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001).  
 95. See Glaeser & Gyourko supra note 74, at 17-18 (“When housing costs rise, the 
owner is essentially hedged . . . The renter, conversely, experiences rising housing costs and 
is poorer in real terms.”).  
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generation.96  Indeed, the increase in housing wealth over the past 30 years 
has accrued “almost exclusively among the wealthiest, older Americans.”97 
Any effective solution to the housing affordability problem must address 
the cause of barriers to increasing housing supply (motivations of certain 
constituents) and not merely the symptom (gaps in affordable housing 
supply).98  Existing homeowners have everything to gain, and little to lose, 
if they can collude to limit housing supply; the tighter the supply of 
housing, the higher the value of homeowners’ real estate investment.  
Homeowners, quite rationally, care a great deal about the value of their 
homes.  For the vast majority of owner-occupants, their home is by far their 
largest financial investment and the single most significant component of 
their household wealth.99 
The value of a home is both difficult to quantify and vulnerable to 
significant market vacillations, as the 2008 Foreclosure Crisis made 
clear.100  Real estate valuation has always presented somewhat of a legal 
and market puzzle in that each parcel is arguably unique (meaning there is 
no true market comparable).101  In addition, subjectivity in real property 
                                                                                                                             
 96. Id. at 18 (speaking of the “reduction in housing supply” that creates “an 
intergenerational transfer to currently older people”). 
 97. Id. at 19. 
 98. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 323-24. 
 99. FISCHEL, supra note 94, at 4; Fennell & Roin, supra note 93, at 144.  “For most U.S. 
families, a home usually comprises the largest portion of their assets.” Laura Shin, The 
Racial Wealth Gap:  Why a Typical White Household Has 16 Times the Wealth of a Black 
One, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/26/the-
racial-wealth-gap-why-a-typical-white-household-has-16-times-the-wealth-of-a-black-one/ 
[https://perma.cc/N67Q-4NX7] (quoting Catherine Ruetschlin saying that, 
“[h]omeownership is the central vehicle Americans use to store wealth, so homeownership 
and access to homeownership are at the heart of that widening wealth gap.”). 
 100. Property values are volatile and are “strongly impacted by fluctuating factors, 
including the quality and cost of improvements, the availability of capital, and the legal 
framework for interests in property.” Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the 
U.S. Real Estate Market Collapse, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 926, 927-28 (2010) [hereinafter 
Price Stability].  From January 1996 to March 2007, average new home sale prices rose 
approximately 112% (from $155,300 to $341,400).  Prices fell in 2007 and 2008, and by 
January 2009 the average new home sale price had dropped to $245,200, a decline of 
twenty-five percent.  Average prices for new homes bounced back up to $384,000 by 
October 2014, another fifty-six percent increase and a new record high. See Median and 
Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/uspricemon.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V9H-
EP2R]. 
 101. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 360 cmt. e; Thomas S. Ulen, The 
Efficiency of Specific Performance:  Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 341, 364 (1984) (noting that land is considered by the law to be a unique 
good).  Because each parcel of land is unique and because there is no organized market that 
prices real estate, “no one knows the true market value of a parcel of real estate until it 
actually sells.” John F. Shampton, Statistical Evidence of Real Estate Valuation:  
Establishing Value Without Appraisers, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 113, 114 (1996); see also, 
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pricing is quite high.102  Generally speaking, there are three primary 
methods for determining the value of a parcel of property:  comparative 
sale valuation, stream of income valuation, and replacement value.103  
Insurers estimate home values based on land purchase price plus the 
estimated cost to reconstruct a home.104  Mortgage lenders value homes as 
collateral and appraise them based on likely proceeds from resale.105  
Builders and homeowners also look to comparative sale prices as the best 
way to estimate their expected return from conveying the property.106  
Landlords, on the other hand, value homes based on the income stream 
they produce and calculate the present value of real estate based on market 
rental rates.107 
Homeowners, mortgage lenders, developers, and local governments all 
directly benefit from high nominal values of homes measured by 
comparative purchase prices, and landlords benefit from higher rental rates.  
                                                                                                                             
Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “real 
estate appraisal is not an exact science”); United States v. Esposito, 970 F.2d 1156, 1160 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that real property and the “relationship between a person and his 
or her home” are unique); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 734 F.2d 774, 788 (11th Cir. 
1984) (“It is well recognized that real property is unique and not fungible.”); Hillard v. 
Franklin, 41 S.W.3d 106, 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“Given that real property is unique, 
damages are generally deemed an inadequate remedy for breach of real estate contracts, and, 
accordingly, such contracts are generally eligible for specific performance.”). But see Tanya 
D. Marsh, Sometimes Blackacre Is a Widget:  Rethinking Commercial Real Estate Contract 
Remedies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 635 (2010). 
 102. Owner occupants have additional, subjective value in their homes.  A home is the 
type of property that is the least fungible and likely the most reflective of an owner’s 
personhood. Radin, supra note 23, at 991-92 (describing a home as “a moral nexus between 
liberty, privacy, and freedom of association”).  For more on particular issues regarding the 
subjective value of a home, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Aspen, 
8th ed. 2011); Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 
277 (2006); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 783, 790-94 (2006); Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
109, 111 (2013); Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation:  The Idiosyncratic Premium 
in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 613 n.71 (2013). 
 103. Price Stability, supra note 100, at 932-36. 
 104. Id. at 934-35.  Replacement valuation is also known as “cost-to-replace” or simply 
the “cost approach.” See Daniel F. Sullivan, Market Value of Single-family Residence—
Market Comparison Appraisal, 5 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 411 (2016 update). 
 105. For lenders, comparative sale prices of similar products in the same local market are 
the most relevant factors in valuation. Price Stability, supra note 100, at 932-34.  
Comparative sales valuations are often cited as the product of an exact appraisal science and 
methodology by those unfamiliar with how these valuations are calculated.  In fact, 
however, comparative sales methodology is very “squishy” and guesstimates abound.  
Reasonable appraisers can come up with widely different estimates of value for a given 
home, even if each appraiser purportedly uses the same process.  For a critique of 
comparative sales valuation, see Shampton, supra note 101, at 124-28. 
 106. See Price Stability, supra note 100, at 932-34. 
 107. See id. at 935. 
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All of these groups are therefore economically motivated to create or 
uphold barriers to increasing the housing supply.108  Local governments are 
theoretically most responsive to demands of current residents, particularly 
homeowners, who have the financial incentive to prop up prices.109  In 
private community governments, the only residents who have a vote are 
property owners, and they directly benefit from high property values.110  
Local governments, whose tax revenue is directly tied to appraised values, 
and developers, who benefit from high sale prices, also support supply 
limitations, although both municipalities and builders would also benefit 
from a controlled increase in supply as long as it is not enough to drive 
property values down.111 
Federal housing policy, perhaps because of its prioritization of 
homeownership over affordable rental housing, also conceptualizes 
property values as something worthy of public protection and support.112  
This is, in part, because higher home values not only benefit homeowners, 
but also their mortgage lenders who depend on collateral valuation to 
protect their loan value, and the government has a vested interest in 
growing mortgage loan collateral values.  Government sponsored 
enterprises in the residential housing secondary mortgage market (Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac) have been particularly concerned with ensuring 
stable property values, and this concern has been framed as an essential 
component of underwriting and ensuring market safety and soundness.113 
In sum, numerous factions and sectors in society are aligned in their 
desire to prop up housing prices, and as long as the legal tools to limit 
supply are readily available and employable to this end, housing prices will 
remain “too damn high,” much to the dismay of affordable housing 
advocates and impoverished members of society in dire need of a 
reasonably priced place to live.114  So long as owners, lenders, developers, 
                                                                                                                             
 108. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 320-21. See also Derek Thompson, Why Middle-Class 
Americans Can’t Afford to Live in Liberal Cities, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/why-are-liberal-cities-so-unafford
able/382045/ [https://perma.cc/XGT3-CQVU]. 
 109. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 94. 
 110. See HYATT, supra note 45. 
 111. See FISCHEL, supra note 94. 
 112. Nation of Renters, supra note 7, at 126-32. 
 113. See Julie Andersen Hill, Shifting Losses:  The Impact of Fannie’s and Freddie’s 
Conservatorships on Commercial Banks, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 343 (2012); Andrea J. 
Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences:  The Role and Control of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489 (2011). 
 114. “Rent is too DAMN high!” was the slogan popularized by habitual fringe New York 
Governor and U.S. Presidential candidate Jimmy McMillan and his self-named “Rent is Too 
Damn High Party.” RENT IS TOO “DAMN” HIGH, http://www.rentistoodamnhigh.org 
[https://perma.cc/PVE7-XGQ4]. 
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and local governments can use zoning and servitude restrictions to limit the 
housing supply, housing development will continue to be unnecessarily 
expensive, and housing costs will continue to be unsustainably inflated.115 
II.  CALCULATING THE COSTS OF COLLECTIVE EXCLUSION 
Allowing a community to exclude (through zoning and restrictive 
covenants) has: 
[I]nhibited the ability of millions of people to participate fully in the 
American economy, deprived the poor of basic services while enriching 
the country’s most privileged citizens, fueled racial and ethnic hostility, 
and, most fundamentally of all, undermined the ability of metropolitan 
residents even to understand each other, let alone work together on the 
region’s problems—all at the cost of billions and billions of taxpayer 
dollars.116 
Because of the broad and significant costs of a group right to exclude, 
courts should be suspicious of such an unfettered collective right.  
Exclusion by a group causes broad social and economic harm and is more 
likely to undermine the human values that property law was designed to 
promote in the first place.117  In order for a collective right to exclude to be 
legitimate, therefore, its benefits must outweigh all costs that the collective 
exclusions would impose on individuals and society as a whole.  These 
costs include the broader societal adverse impacts that community 
exclusion has on housing affordability, integration, and economic growth. 
Limiting density and housing types artificially increases property values 
and drives up rents.  Homeowners may perceive inflated property values to 
be a good thing, but inflated home values also lead to higher housing 
costs.118  Barriers to entry for new housing units interfere with the free-
market forces of supply and demand and can lead to a loss of economic 
output in an area where the housing supply is constrained.119  This market 
                                                                                                                             
 115. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 320-21; Nation of Renters, supra note 7. 
 116. Frug, supra note 36, at 1048. For a more recent economic study attempting to 
measure these costs, see Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 74. 
 117. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“property rights serve human 
values”); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
675-78 (1988) (arguing that the right to exclude should always be limited in cases when 
non-owners need access to property to prevent serious harm). See also Glazer, supra note 
17, at 341-42.  Even though the right to exclude has achieved special status in the lexicon of 
property rights, this right has never been absolute, nor has exclusion as a property right been 
fully theorized in the context of the collective rather than the individual. See Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2009); 
RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); NELSON, supra note 29. 
 118. Eagle, supra note 1, at 359. 
 119. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 74, at 22-24; Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, 
Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
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meddling creates inefficiencies and effectuates a wealth transfer from the 
poorer members of society who have to pay more for housing to society’s 
richer homeowners who enjoy the benefits of growing equity values.120  
Housing supply limitations significantly decrease equality of opportunity 
and housing equity.  Furthermore, because the government, through 
housing assistance programs, pays for some of the increased housing costs 
resulting from affordable housing supply limitations, such collective 
exclusions also impose financial costs on the taxpaying public.121  In this 
way, limitations on housing supply reallocate economic value from the 
public as a whole to exclusive neighborhood homeowners as a group. 
Although homeowners enjoy an inequitable economic benefit from 
exclusionary limitations on housing supply, members of exclusive 
communities may also impose psychological harms on society generally 
and, in fact, upon themselves.   New York University Humanities and 
London School of Economics Sociology Professor Richard Sennett posits 
that community diversity exposes community members to a wider spectrum 
of perspectives and promotes healthier and more sustainable individual 
attitudes and group dynamics; while, on the other hand, living in a less 
diverse neighborhood can be psychologically and socially limiting.122  An 
                                                                                                                             
Working Paper No. 21154, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21154.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3QLH-E7HY]. 
 120. Limitations on a homeowner’s ability to rent her property, rather than a limitation on 
supply of rentals, impose costs on would-be landlords as well as would-be tenants. 
American Dream in Flux, supra note 8, at 281-91.  See also Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 
74. 
 121. Nation of Renters, supra note 7, at 134 (talking about how amount of government 
funding in housing vouchers is based on market rental rates).  See also MICHAEL DESMOND, 
EVICTED:  POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016).   
Today, landlords overcharge voucher holders simply because they can. In 
distressed neighborhoods, where voucher holders tend to live, market rent is lower 
than what landlords are allowed to charge voucher holders, according to 
metropolitan-wide rent ceilings set by program administrators. So the Housing 
Choice Voucher Program likely costs not millions but billions of dollars more 
than it should, resulting in the unnecessary denial of help to hundreds of thousands 
of families. 
Id. at 311.  HUD has recently started calculating rental rates based on zip code in some 
areas.  Id. at 402-03 n.55.  On the impact of overcharging in Milwaukee, see id. at 356-66 
n.6. 
 122. RICHARD SENNETT, FLESH AND STONE:  THE BODY AND THE CITY IN WESTERN 
CIVILIZATION 26-27 (1994).  Sennett believes that a community’s desire for insular 
homogeneity is a manifestation of an “adolescent” psychological state, reflecting an 
immature and vulnerable mindset. SENNETT, supra note 28, at 16-49.  Sennett’s terminology 
reflects the widely accepted psychological theory that adolescents seek predictability and 
sameness to help cope with anxiety about the unknown and the bewildering. SENNETT, supra 
note 28, at 16-49.  In her magnum opus, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane 
Jacobs also famously extoled the broad social values promoted by creating healthy, diverse, 
and densely populated neighborhoods. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT 
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externally constructed homogeneous community does not inspire true 
identity and cohesion among its members, but rather establishes a fragile 
myth of commonality.123  In the context of imposed and artificial 
neighborhood commonality, the collective focus on exclusion of the 
“other” actually amplifies the fear of “otherness,” and fear of “otherness” 
can intensify until “the collective sense of vulnerability to otherness 
becomes so strong that acts of aggression against outsiders, even violence, 
can appear life-preserving; the very survival of the community seems to 
depend on the exclusion of difference, on the control of disorder.”124 
A vulnerable, homogeneous community, therefore, may in the long term 
pose more societal risk than would a diverse, inclusive one.  Such a 
“purified community” keeps its members in a “state of absolute bondage to 
the status quo, diminishing their ability to absorb and enjoy the world,” 
suggesting that an unfettered collective right to exclude the “other” 
imposes high costs indeed, for both individual community members and 
society as a whole.125 
In addition to imposing economic and psychological costs on members 
of the excluding group, communities’ rights to exclude create separate and 
unequal neighborhood realities and impose harms on excluded individuals 
as well.126  Historically, community exclusion based on race led to the 
ghettoization of America, poignantly described in Douglas Massey and 
Nancy Denton’s book, American Apartheid:  Segregation and the Making 
of the Underclass.127  A century of empowering wealthier, whiter, suburban 
                                                                                                                             
AMERICAN CITIES (1961).  Renowned legal scholars have also cited the benefits of diverse 
neighborhoods to justify calls for less exclusionary communities. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 
36, at 1051 (advocating the societal benefits to be gained by “citizens’ engagement with 
otherness”). 
 123. Because they are not yet able to achieve a mature tolerance of differences, 
adolescents typically practice a strategy of avoidance to create a facade of control. See also 
Frug, supra note 36, at 1052-53.  Adolescents seek the artificial comfort of sameness and 
eschew diversity in order to construct a “fantasy of community” that is devoid of true, deep 
human connections. SENNETT, supra note 28, at 37-39. See also Frug, supra note 36, at 
1052-53. 
 124. Frug, supra note 36, at 1053. 
 125. SENNETT, supra note 28, at 134; Frug, supra note 36, at 1053 (discussing Sennett’s 
hypothesis).  
 126. Side by Side, supra note 78 (manuscript at 17-18, nn.53-60 and accompanying text). 
 127. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 35, at 17-60.  For the past century, zoning and 
covenants have successfully excluded minorities and lower-income households from 
wealthier, healthier neighborhoods.  When distressed, predominantly minority 
neighborhoods were revitalized through urban renewal projects, the disadvantaged local 
residents generally were forcibly removed and/or their community was sliced up by new 
highways and non-residential developments. See MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL 
BULLDOZER:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL 1949-1962 (1964); Peter Marris, A 
Report on Urban Renewal in the United States, in THE URBAN CONDITION 113, 119 
(Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963). 
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groups to exclude created a pervasive geography of “separate, hostile, and 
unequal” neighborhoods,128 racially defined and inequitable per numerous 
metrics.129  Minority neighborhoods are disadvantaged in a wide variety of 
ways, not only because their residents are more impoverished.130  Lower-
income communities may be located outside of a reasonable commuting 
distance to employment options or away from public transportation which 
renders poorer residents immobile.131  Housing in predominantly minority 
neighborhoods is usually further away from public amenities and provided 
with fewer public services,132 and poorer neighborhoods are more likely to 
be distant from recreational and retail venues, even including grocery 
stores.133  Inhabitants of high-poverty, minority neighborhoods are 
generally located farther away from hospitals and health care providers, 
and inhabitants of these communities accordingly suffer a variety of 
adverse health outcomes.134  Buildings and other infrastructure in poorer 
minority communities are far less likely to be adequately maintained.135 
Not only are poor, minority neighborhoods more likely to be denied 
geographical access to public goods, services, and amenities, they are more 
likely to be situated proximate to noxious uses that further decrease the 
quality of life of their residents.136  Such value-destroying hazards range 
“from dangerous and environmentally toxic . . . to more commonplace 
hazards.”137  This disparate treatment of minority communities once again 
reflects the relative political power of wealthier (and whiter) homevoter 
                                                                                                                             
 128. ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS:  BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, 
UNEQUAL 46-51 (1992).  See also James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America:  An Historical 
and Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial Segregation in the United States, 22 HOW. L.J. 
547, 559-60 (1979). 
 129. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 35; Frug, supra note 36, at 1074.  
 130. For a discussion of some of the many ways that impoverished neighborhoods 
disadvantage their inhabitants in terms of health, wealth, and prospects, see DESMOND, supra 
note 121, at 256-57, 305-06.  See generally Side by Side, supra note 78. 
 131. Sager, supra note 50, at 781-82. See also Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan 
for Fair Employment:  Plant Location in White Suburbia, 25 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 383 
(1971) (discussing location of public and private employment facilities away from black 
communities). 
 132. “Service deficiencies typically involve street paving and lighting, surface water 
drainage, sewers, water mains and fire hydrants, parks and recreational facilities, and police, 
fire, sanitation and public utility services.” Dubin, supra note 54, at n.91. See also Donald 
G. Hagman, The Use of Boundary Lines to Discriminate in the Provision of Services by 
Race, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 849 (1977). 
 133. Sager, supra note 50, at 781-82. 
 134. Cassandra Q. Butts, The Color of Money:  Barriers to Access to Private Health Care 
Facilities for African-Americans, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 159, 161-62 (1992) (discussing 
relocation of hospitals away from black communities). 
 135. Sager, supra note 50, at 781-82. 
 136. Dubin, supra note 54, at 742. 
 137. Id. 
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groups.  Empowered, and armed with their legally protected right to 
exclude, homevoter groups can successfully assert what is commonly 
known as “NIMBY-ism,” the exclusion of undesirable uses from their 
neighborhoods.138  If such uses are costly, but necessary for regional 
development (for example, communities may need a sewage treatment 
plant or a garbage disposal facility), they must be put in someone’s 
backyard and, unsurprisingly, such uses end up in the backyard of the least 
politically empowered communities. 
A community’s right to exclude is unjustifiable unless its purported 
benefits outweigh its costs, including costs borne by society and various 
would-be community residents.  Property value increases may benefit 
neighborhood homeowners but still be inadequate to justify their broader, 
external harms.  For example, renters who cannot find affordable housing 
in a low-poverty, high-opportunity neighborhood are relegated to living in 
less healthy, less safe, and less desirable communities,139 and the context of 
one’s residence impacts long-term outcomes for members of a 
household.140  “Siting of affordable housing in low-income, high-minority 
neighborhoods and clustering public housing in huge projects that are 
geographically distant from amenities and commercial activity do not 
alleviate the long-term effects of poverty.”141  Individual rental assistance 
does nothing to end “the cycle of intergenerational inequality of 
opportunity, particularly if recipients remain in impoverished 
neighborhoods.”142  Residents’ inability to break out of a disadvantaged 
economic state means that their housing assistance requirements will not 
foreseeably abate, and already there are more than four times as many 
qualified applicants for public housing funds than there is available 
funding.143  Unless public funding for affordable housing increases fourfold 
                                                                                                                             
 138. NIMBY is an acronym for “Not in My Backyard.” Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims 
of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).  Closely related to NIMBY are LULUs 
(Locally Undesired Land Uses); both concepts which focus on relocating costs onto less 
politically agile communities and persons.  Some housing commentators suggest that there 
is an even more extreme form of a reflexive desire to exclude:  BANANA, meaning “Build 
Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone.” Id. 
 139. Side by Side, supra note 78 (manuscript at 17-18, nn.53-60 and accompanying text); 
Detroit, supra note 63, at 582-84. 
 140. See Ingrid Gould Ellen & Margery Austin Turner, Does Neighborhood Matter? 
Assessing Recent Evidence, 8 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 833 (1997); John Goering et al., A 
Cross-Site Analysis of Initial Moving to Opportunity Demonstration Results, 13 J. HOUS. 
RES. 2 (2002); Maria Cruz Melendez, Moving to Opportunity & Mending Broken Windows, 
32 J. LEGIS. 238 (2006); Kelly DeRango, Black-White Segregation, Discrimination, and 
Home Ownership (Upjohn Inst. for Emp’t Research Working Paper No. 01-71, 2001). 
 141. Side by Side, supra note 78 (manuscript at 20). 
 142. Id. at (manuscript at 20). 
 143. Out of Reach 2015, supra note 79, at iii. 
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(at least), today’s financial supports must be carefully invested to build 
future affordability rather than simply set up an unending need for public 
subsidy.144 
Location of affordable housing is a key component of crafting a more 
permanent solution to the affordable/fair-housing conundrum.145  Children 
growing up in distressed neighborhoods, attending inadequate schools, and 
coping with the effects of neighborhood crime and violence are more likely 
to remain in the cycle of poverty as adults.146  Concentrated poverty is 
morally troubling and inequitable.  Economically, concentrated poverty is 
inefficient because it perpetuates an aid recipient’s demand for and 
dependence on public funds rather than charting a path to independence.  
Individual critical needs for access, in terms of access to quality 
neighborhoods and access to an adequate supply of affordable rental 
housing, and society’s interests in meeting such needs, outweigh the hollow 
assertions that a neighborhood should have the right to exclude the “other” 
in order to preserve neighborhood homogeneity and boost neighborhood 
real estate prices.147 
III.  HOW TO LIMIT THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
Over the past century, courts have increasingly held that individual 
property rights must give way to collective community judgments 
regarding “use” and exclusion.148  Considering the harms that certain 
                                                                                                                             
 144. Essentially, this is the principle of “teaching a man to fish,” rather than merely 
providing him with fish to eat.  Maxims to this effect have been traced to various 
philosophical commentaries and traditional proverbs in several cultures. See Give a Man a 
Fish, and You Feed Him for a Day. Teach a Man To Fish, and You Feed Him for a Lifetime, 
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/08/28/fish/ [https://perma.cc/597T-MLJT]. 
 145. See generally Eagle, supra note 1; see also Side by Side, supra note 78. 
 146. According to the “Moving to Opportunities” Study, a decades-long experiment 
conducted by HUD starting in the 1990s, children who relocated from disadvantaged 
neighborhoods to neighborhoods with “high opportunity” experienced better ultimate 
educational and employment outcomes than children who remained in impoverished 
communities. See Margery Austin Turner et al., URBAN INSTITUTE, Benefits of Living in 
High-Opportunity Neighborhoods:  Insights from the Moving to Opportunity Demonstration 
(2012). See also Goering et al., supra note 140; Melendez, supra note 140.  Citing other 
studies, however, some scholars doubt the validity of HUD’s findings. See Ellickson, False 
Promise, supra note 28, at 1014-15 (discussing Philip Oreopoulos, The Long-Run 
Consequences of Living in a Poor Neighborhoods, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1533 (2003)). 
 147. For discussions regarding why and when the right to exclude should be limited 
based on costs imposed on non-owners, see Singer, supra note 117, at 675. See also Joseph 
William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1391 
(2013); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates:  Property Law in a Free and 
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1010, 1054-55 (2009); Gregory S. 
Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 
(2009). 
 148. See supra notes 20, 51, and accompanying text. 
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community exclusions impose on communities, owners and excluded 
would-be residents, as well as general negative impacts on housing 
affordability and equity, it is time for American property law to reclaim 
individual property autonomy and allow individuals to opt out of certain 
types of collective efforts to exclude.  In situations where community 
exclusionary powers are being used merely to promote property values or 
group identity rather than to combat a legitimate problem of negative 
externalities or a true tragedy of the commons, empowering individuals to 
defect from the group’s exclusivity scheme could ameliorate its social and 
personal harms.  Allowing greater individual owner autonomy relative to a 
group’s majority-rule exclusions may not at first seem to be a sufficient 
method to limit the collective right to exclude because it relies on the hope 
that individuals will “do the right thing” rather than on the power of the 
government to compel a certain result.  This approach may be more 
palatable to our pluralistic society, however, and it avoids the political 
problems that reliance on a government-imposed solution would create.149  
Empowering individual property owners to make more autonomous 
decisions regarding their property’s transfer and use may embolden the 
housing market’s invisible hand and encourage improvements in affordable 
and fair housing as individual owners attempt to maximize their individual, 
rather than their collective, property values. 
Part III, Section A of this Article explains briefly how federal and state 
efforts to solve housing problems through regulation and affirmative 
requirements have proven ineffective.  Section B discusses why diversity 
and affordability are good for the economy and explains why individual 
economic maximization efforts may result in more affordable and equitable 
housing options if collective exclusionary power were somewhat 
constrained.  Section C then suggests that protecting individual property 
rights relative to group-imposed use and transfer limitations is not only 
theoretically justifiable, but would also have salutatory effects in our 
housing system. 
A. Ineffectiveness of Top-Down Control of Local Housing Exclusion 
Every level of government has been complicit in creating and 
perpetuating unfair and unaffordable housing, and every level of 
government has also attempted to affirmatively combat these problems in 
                                                                                                                             
 149. Furthermore, there is ample reason to believe that governments lack the political 
will to rein in zoning and servitude exclusionary efforts of their constituents. See Eagle, 
supra note 1, at 348-49; see also supra notes 3-4, 11-12, 61-63, 94-96 and accompanying 
text. 
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several ways.150  The federal government passed the Fair Housing Act in 
1968, pursuant to which all Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) aid 
recipients were affirmatively required to “further fair housing.”151  The 
precise scope of this requirement has varied during the past fifty years, as 
has HUD’s ability and inclination to take decisive strides toward improving 
housing equity.  In 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the concept of 
disparate impact as a basis for a Fair Housing Act violation, and in the 
aftermath of this decision,152  HUD finalized its current “Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing” (“AFFH”) Rule.  The current AFFH Rule 
requires states and localities to specifically test the impact of housing 
decisions on housing integration aspirations.153  In 2016, Congress showed 
an increased willingness to address affordable housing issues, and 
unanimously passed the Housing Opportunities Through Modernization 
Act (“HOTMA”), which was signed into law by President Obama in July 
2016.154  Based on these developments, as of 2015 and 2016, the fair 
housing pendulum appeared to be swinging toward more active federal 
involvement, but current uncertainties about HUD’s fair housing policies in 
the Trump administration have tempered the hopes that the Fair Housing 
Act would finally “get its groove back.”155 
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2507, 2525 (2015). 
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-7XG6].  The full text of the HOTMA is available at Housing Opportunity Through 
Modernization Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-201, https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/
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since the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1988. See Will Fischer, Housing 
Bill Unanimously Passed by House Would Build on Effectiveness of Rental Assistance, CTR. 
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housing-bill-unanimously-passed-by-house-would-build-on-effectiveness-of-rental 
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 155. This phrase is not only a nod to the novel HOW STELLA GOT HER GROOVE BACK, by 
Terry McMillan, but also gratefully references the fair-housing discussion group at the 2016 
annual meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools entitled “Has Fair Housing 
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Oliveri.  For current speculation regarding HUD during the Trump administration, see Lisa 
Rein & Elise Viebeck, HUD Job to Pit Carson Ideology Against Long-standing Housing 
Policy, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/hud-job-to-
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The federal government plays a key role in promoting housing 
affordability as well.  HUD provides rental assistance in the form of 
vouchers, payable to landlords or to tenants, that attempt to bridge the gap 
between what lower-income renters can pay and what landlords 
legitimately expect to receive in rent.156  Other federal affordable housing 
programs, such as the low-income housing tax credit (“LIHTC”) and 
various development grants, attempt to grow the supply of affordable 
housing.157  One problem with federal affordable housing efforts is that 
they historically have been concerned with quantity of housing rather than 
the location of affordable units.158  Because housing funds have historically 
been allocated without affirmatively considering the optimum location for 
affordable housing, and because of the effectiveness of community 
exclusions described above, most affordable housing is located in high-
poverty neighborhoods.159  Another problem with federal affordable 
housing funding is that the aid provided is hugely insufficient to meet 
needs.160  Insufficient funding means that housing assistance ends up being 
allocated based either on political judgments regarding merit or even on 
sheer luck.161 
Even though the federal government sets the tone for policy and 
provides much of the funding for fair and affordable housing efforts, local 
governments continue to control almost all of the nation’s land-use 
decisions.  In this role, local governments regulate the placement, 
allocation, and approach to housing production and neighborhood 
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 159. Cashin, supra note 36, at 1683-84. 
 160. See supra notes 143-44. 
 161. Side by Side, supra note 78 (manuscript at 12). 
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design.162  Although local governments purport to promote affordable 
housing production and housing integration, almost fifty years of local 
government action under the Fair Housing Act has failed to alleviate 
housing inequities and unaffordability.163  It seems as though unconstrained 
majority-rule local government control of land use in our pluralistic society 
inhibits a sustainable housing system from developing naturally 
(legislatively).  Even if local governments accurately do express the desires 
of their constituents, homeowners typically vote their pocketbook over 
what may be in society’s best interests for the production and placement of 
affordable housing.  A collective right to exclude through zoning and 
restrictive covenants essentially creates a legally enforced monopoly on 
housing affordability.  Homeowners can avoid the collective action 
problem that would undermine un-coordinated efforts to fix the prices of 
housing by limiting supply and excluding certain types of residences and 
residents because they can act as collectively.164  Our land use decisions are 
made by community groups who collectively prioritize their insular self-
interest over broader state or national concerns.165   
For decades, scholars have recognized that a political solution to housing 
integration and affordability is unlikely.  In the 1990s, Professor Frug 
postulated that “[o]nly a central government seems capable of bringing 
together the disparate groups that have grown so remote from each 
other.”166  In his current article on the intractability of affordable housing, 
Professor Eagle agrees that local governmental solutions are unrealistic.167  
Both Frug and Eagle admit, however, that a federal solution to local 
                                                                                                                             
 162. Id. at (manuscript at 12). 
 163. The degree of de facto housing segregation and the problem of housing 
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powers and policies.” Frug, supra note 36, at 1074. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Eagle, supra note 1, at 305. 
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exclusionary policies is likewise improbable.168  Congress has shown no 
desire to rein in state or municipal zoning powers, nor has it indicated any 
discomfort with the broad exclusionary authority exercised by common 
interest community governments.  To date, courts have typically deferred 
to public and private local group decisions with respect to land use.169 
B. Economic Motivators and Market Meddling 
All levels of the government seem to be fairly impotent when it comes to 
growing affordable housing supply in a way that addresses long-term 
housing challenges.  Economic incentives could motivate owners to 
individually respond to growing demand for rental housing by producing 
more and varied rental housing supply, but individual responses are not 
possible under our current land use system.  If markets are left 
unrestrained, however, housing equity and affordability may both improve 
in response to pent up demand.  Not only would more affordable housing 
result from a freer market, but more affordable housing itself would create 
a positive economic effect.  According to a recent National Bureau of 
Economics study,170 housing affordability in a region increases general 
economic prosperity in several ways, and this affordability-prosperity 
connection provides further justification for allowing markets the freedom 
to promote housing affordability.171 
City and regional productivity increases when housing markets are in 
sync, with sufficient supply to meet demand.  More affordable housing 
leads to more robust economic growth.172  San Francisco, for example, has 
aggressively promulgated anti-density zoning laws that have kept housing 
prices in the city high.  The city’s expensive housing inhibits its economic 
growth and explains why San Francisco’s economy is growing slower than, 
for example, Houston’s economy.173  On the other hand, Houston, the only 
                                                                                                                             
 168. Id. at 350-53. 
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 170. Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 119. 
 171. Eagle, supra note 1, at 312-14; see also Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 74. 
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 173. Id. See also Eagle, supra note 1, at 323. 
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large city in America that does not engage in use-based zoning, has much 
more affordable rents, and lower rents have fueled the city’s relatively 
rapid prosperity gains.174 
Another related way that affordable housing leads to economic 
prosperity is that communities with housing available for households of all 
income levels will attract workers at all income levels who can live close to 
their employment.175  Affordability increases labor’s mobility and its 
optimum allocation.176  A variety of housing options in a community 
benefits households along the entire income spectrum.177  And because 
middle- and lower-income workers typically provide services that benefit 
upper-income residents, and higher-income residents provide relatively 
more tax revenue, local income diversity benefits everyone.  A community 
is enriched when schoolteachers, firemen, police, retail, and food service 
workers can all live in the neighborhoods in which they work.178 
Barriers to community entry are problematic when they keep affordable 
housing out of wealthier neighborhoods.  Neighborhood exclusion also 
inhibits productivity when gentrification is excluded from a neighborhood 
in distress.  From an economic standpoint, the best thing that can happen to 
economically distressed neighborhoods, such as declining urban cores, may 
very well be gentrification.179  A community can benefit from economic 
revitalization in several ways, particularly when infrastructure and property 
value improvements occur organically, through market actors, rather than 
according to a top-down comprehensive “urban renewal” program that may 
abusively employ a government’s eminent domain powers.180  
Revitalization provides justifiable benefits, however, only when existing 
residents are not forced to relocate, either because of eminent domain or 
rising housing costs. 
Some scholars opine that the biggest downside to increasing affordable 
housing in healthy communities and gentrifying distressed communities is 
that such developments permit the influx of “others” into a community in a 
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way that denies the collective its right to exclude.181  Admittedly, a 
lessened ability to exclude might harm group identity and neighborhood 
“authenticity” and lead to loss of a sense of community.182  The purported 
value of community homogeneity is overstated, however, and results from 
and perpetuates faulty assumptions regarding the absolute benefit of 
preserving group autonomy and collective property values.  Not only are 
individual and communal benefits from group exclusions exaggerated (or at 
least unquantifiable), but community exclusivity imposes significant 
communal and individual costs.183 
Once freed from a group’s deliberate exclusionary control, economic 
forces in a housing market will naturally promote housing affordability, 
and housing affordability is the key to housing equity.184  Unless a true 
efficiency problem exists (as in the case of negative externalities or the 
tragedy of the commons), there is no market justification for neighborhood 
barriers to entry—whether with respect to integrated affordable housing or 
gentrification.  A desire to preserve group dynamics, community identity, 
and inflated property values fails to provide a convincing justification for 
group exclusion when balanced against the lost opportunity costs related to 
unaffordability and the individual harms that exclusion imposes on the 
most vulnerable segments of society. 
C. An Individual Rights Approach to Controlling the Collective 
Because politics stymie a macro-level solution to housing affordability 
and equity, a micro-level, individual rights approach may be the best option 
to control unjustified exclusions by local community groups.185  An 
individual property rights approach to constraining group exclusionary 
power avoids housing’s realpolitik of opposing constituent priorities and 
group collusive price-fixing.  Increased judicial protection of individual 
property rights is justifiable both theoretically and based on positive 
societal effect and could constrain harmful group exclusions without 
needing to navigate the impenetrable political jungle of land-use politics.186 
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Property law provides ample theoretical support for favoring the 
protection of individual property rights over the majority-rule powers of a 
group.  A group’s power to exclude directly limits the rights of its members 
to invite and include and indirectly limits members’ rights to individually 
transfer their property and to use it in the most economically efficient, 
utility-optimizing way.  The various theories that justify legal protection of 
private property as a general matter, including utilitarianism, personhood, 
labor, and civic republicanism, all justify prioritizing individual rights over 
the rights of a collective as long as a clear market failure (such as a 
negative externality or freeriding) does not suggest otherwise.187 
Utilitarian theory posits that property rights are justified as a means to 
maximize societal happiness, and for utilitarians, happiness is measured by 
aggregating individuals’ utility.188  In espousing his view of utilitarian 
theory, Jeremy Bentham explained that when property is under individual 
control, aggregate wealth naturally increases as people rationally seek to 
increase their own personal wealth.189  According to the modern law and 
economics strain of utilitarianism, allocation schemes and property rights 
protections are justifiable only to the extent they promote optimal societal 
utility.190  Utilitarian theory is perhaps the most popular and influential 
theory underlying property law today,191 even though the theory’s 
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imperfections are acknowledged.192  Not only do people sometimes behave 
in economically irrational ways, but economic theory ignores the fact that 
some values are stubbornly non-quantifiable.193 
In spite of the imperfections of economic theory in the real world, 
individual decision-making is still likelier than group decision-making to 
come close to the ideal of rational maximization of utility.  Group 
dynamics are complicated and often the result of messy bargaining among 
unequally situated constituents.194  Decision-making by a group is often 
even more likely to be based on irrational and incorrect assumptions.195  A 
homogeneous community’s fear of outsiders and group peer pressure do 
not aid decision-making rationality.  When the collective imposes its will 
on dissenting individuals, this discounts the value of individual judgments, 
and inhibits rather than cultivates aggregate utility.  Such a devaluation of 
individual utility is unjustified except in the case of a market failure, such 
as where increasing an individual’s utility creates a true negative cost 
externality or where common property use is involved.196  In cases where 
legitimate cost externalities do not exist, and issues involving the need to 
exclude non-contributing users from common property are not involved, 
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individual decision making should take precedence as more likely to reflect 
and achieve aggregate utility maximization. 
Several property law scholars agree.  An individually focused view of 
utilitarianism accords with Professor Gregory Alexander’s property theory 
of “human flourishing.”197  Individual empowerment is essential in 
Alexander’s human flourishing model198 because group-level flourishing 
would ignore society’s “morally pluralistic” reality.  Alexander “rejects the 
notion that there exists a single, irreducible, fundamental moral value to 
which all other moral values may be reduced,” and explains that endowing 
individuals with property right protections simultaneously achieves 
multiple societal values in an egalitarian and equitable way.199  Individual 
empowerment is therefore key to maximum human flourishing, contrasted 
with group coercion of its constituent dissenters, which is disrespectful to 
society’s pluralism and to individual worth.  Professors Iglesias and Eagle 
have also both stressed that the pluralistic perspectives of community 
values render collective solutions to affordable housing both unlikely and 
less justifiable.200  Societal pluralism not only predicts persistent political 
impasse, but also provides a moral mandate for individual-level property 
rights protection as a counter-balance to group rights to exclude. 
The personhood theory of property law likewise justifies protecting 
individual rights to property from group-based desires to exclude.201  The 
collective right to exclude from a community (as opposed to exclusions 
from specific commonly held property) necessarily involves limiting an 
individual owner’s ability to invite, include, use, and transfer her own 
property.  In the realm of residential neighborhoods, the res involved is 
typically an individual’s home, the particular type of real property that 
personhood theory deems the most personal and thus most worthy of 
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protection.202  Group control of an individual’s ability to use and transfer 
her property, such as limitations on leasing, may render an owner’s 
continued tenure economically unfeasible, coercing an owner to relinquish 
ownership before she wishes, and this raises liberty and fairness issues.203  
The identity-related, personhood harms imposed by group control of a 
person’s home are akin to those autonomy and personhood harms created 
when government takes private homes for the community’s “economic 
benefit.”204  Similarly, a collective’s right to exclude limits an individual’s 
ability to invite, diminishing her liberty, autonomy, and identity-based 
expressive rights. 
Property law’s civic republican theory also justifies protecting individual 
rather than group self-determination with respect to property.  According to 
civic republican theory, property ownership facilitates democracy and 
freedom.205  Thomas Jefferson, an early proponent of this theory, believed 
that citizens’ ability to exercise their natural rights of liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness are best protected by allowing individuals autonomy with 
respect to real property they own.206  Private property and individual 
autonomy with respect to its transfer, use, and exclusion not only protect 
people from government tyranny, but also ensure independence from 
municipal and private community control.  More recently, Professor 
Sunstein similarly described how safeguarding an individual’s autonomy 
with respect to her private property preserves and protects democratic 
values.  As Sunstein explained: 
[I]n a state in which private property does not exist, citizens are dependent 
on the good will of government officials, almost on a daily basis . . . . 
They come to the state as supplicants or beggars rather than rightholders.  
Any challenge to the state may be stifled or driven underground by virtue 
of the fact that serious challenges could result in the withdrawal of the 
goods that give people basic security.  A right to private property, free 
from government interference, is in this sense a necessary basis for a 
democracy.207 
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A more individualistic approach to land use controls would protect 
independence and democracy not only in the context of state and federal 
governments, but also with respect to localities.  Municipal governments 
and their highly lobbied zoning boards and private community 
governments, do not always carry out the will of their constituent majority, 
in practice.208 
Professor Richard Pipes, a notable Russian scholar at Harvard, also 
believes that individual autonomy is essential to democracy and, in fact, 
postulates that it is society’s need to protect private property rights that 
justifies the very existence of the state.209  According to Pipes, it is 
impossible to have personal freedom and liberty without the right to 
individual control of private property.210  Pipes famously opined that, 
“while property in some form is possible without liberty, the contrary is 
inconceivable.”211  These important societal values—individual autonomy, 
freedom, and individual and societal efficiency—can only be achieved if, 
as a general rule, individuals retain the right to control their own property, 
free from unjustifiable group-level efforts to exclude the “other” in a way 
that overcomes constituent property owners’ will.212 
A group’s power to exclude also limits the rights of non-owners to 
community access.  The individual rights of non-owners deserve judicial 
recognition and protection as well.213  Would-be residents of a community 
lose their right to access public goods and services in a desirable 
neighborhood when zoning laws or restrictive covenants operate to keep 
them out.  Rampant Euclidean zoning in effect segregates residents by 
income (and often by race). Restrictive covenants that disparately exclude 
poor and minority would-be community residents from the best 
neighborhoods (with some of the best public schools) are common.214  
These sorts of exclusionary barriers impose unjustifiable costs on the most 
disadvantaged segments of society and, as such, are inherently unjust under 
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a Rawlsian definition of justice.215  When groups erect barriers to entry into 
“their” communities in order to keep “them” out, liberty of those excluded 
is sacrificed on the altar of the group’s asserted right of self-
determination.216 
A century of empowered group exclusions has imposed clear and 
significant adverse effects on vulnerable segments of American society.  As 
notable Professors Massey and Denton, authors of American Apartheid:  
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, point out, today’s 
residential hypersegregation was caused by allowing and even encouraging 
communities to exercise an unfettered (and, later, barely fettered) right to 
exclude persons of color and lower-income residents.217  Urban black 
ghettos have their origin in a robust group right to exclude.218  The general 
practice of siting the bulk of affordable housing in high-poverty 
neighborhoods perpetuates the cycle of poverty and relegates poor and 
minority households to a reality plagued by neighborhood violence, lack of 
community amenities, inadequate schools, and poor health outcomes.219  
Allowing the collective to exclude the “other” has thus rendered the 
American ideal of equality of opportunity illusory.220  Yes, exclusion by a 
group may, in fact, support constituent property valuations, but this reverse 
Robin Hood allocation of housing costs, so the poor pay more in order to 
“feed” the rich, is both unjust and unjustifiable.221 
CONCLUSION 
Our housing system has long struggled with persistent segregation, 
unaffordability, and tension between neighborhood decline and 
revitalization, and little improvement in these metrics has been seen over 
the past decades.  Scholarship explaining why these problems are 
intractable may help spur a search for novel legal solutions because, after 
all, admitting that we have a problem is step number one.222  Various 
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interest holders have diametrically opposed goals when it comes to the 
price of housing and neighborhood content.223  Many of our laws and 
regulations have been enacted and justified as ways to preserve “property 
values,” based on the presumption that owners of property in a 
neighborhood have the legal right to enact protective policies to buoy their 
home’s market value.224   
We have allowed neighborhoods to collude to exclude.  There is 
insufficient justification for allowing such a broad collective right, 
notwithstanding a community’s preference for higher property values and 
our country’s general lack of consensus regarding housing policy priorities.  
Group exclusions are costly, and these costs are imposed not only on the 
group’s constituent members but also on would-be homebuyers and renters 
and the public as a whole.  In addition to perpetuating housing 
unaffordability, community exclusivity in order to preserve the 
community’s property values re-entrenches historic housing inequality and 
patterns of residential segregation.225  Legal, market, social, and political 
forces have conspired to effectively exclude “others” from entering 
homogeneous neighborhoods, in spite of fair housing laws and decades of 
anti-housing-segregation advocacy.226  Allowing groups to exclude for the 
sake of exclusivity has prolonged market inefficiencies and created 
inequitable constraints on and placement of the affordable housing 
supply.227 
The intractable lack of consensus regarding housing policy priorities 
does not mean that our legal system is powerless to promote fair and 
affordable housing goals.  Political disagreements have only been able to 
effectively inhibit affordable and fair housing because the law has allowed 
groups an almost unlimited right to exclude.  Communities have been able 
to exclude additional housing units, certain property uses, and even certain 
people from their midst.  The collective’s right to exclude populations and 
residential uses has unjustifiably contributed to housing’s inequity and 
expense.228 
Communities have long employed exclusionary tools to self-segregate 
by income and divert investment out of broadly accessible public goods, 
for example by crafting excessively fractionalized school districting 
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schemes rather than more sustainable regional ones.229  Allowing 
communities this broad discretion to exclude at the whim of the majority 
tramples individual ability to deviate from community norms and erodes 
the associated human rights of individual autonomy, liberty, and 
personhood that property law is designed to protect.  Collective exclusion 
evidences not only the tyranny of the majority over individual choice and 
defection, but also the tyranny of the empowered, allowing wealthier 
segments of society to profit on the backs of the least advantaged.  
Community exclusion that denies access and wealth-building opportunities 
to society’s most vulnerable individuals eradicates equality of opportunity 
and flies in the face of Rawlsian justice.230  Group identity and 
homeowners’ property values may be legitimate concerns, but these 
individual preferences do not trump the compelling societal needs for 
housing integration, equity, and affordability. 
Because affordable housing is a politically tangled issue, attempts to 
control a group’s right to exclude through top-down regulation and 
oversight have proven fairly ineffective.  On the other hand, a judicially 
protected renaissance of individual property rights could provide a 
counterbalance to a collective’s desire to exclude.  Endowing individual 
owners with the presumption of autonomy with respect to their property 
use, access, and transferability would break through our housing system’s 
restraints on land use and transfer, eventually rendering housing less costly 
and more integrated.231  The rights of individuals—owners as well as non-
owners and would-be residents—need property law protections from group 
exclusionary powers.  Although the right to exclude may be an essential 
stick in property’s metaphorical bundle, it is a right to be exercised by and 
for the benefit of individuals, not a tool for inequitable, collective control. 
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